Final Thoughts on China's Approach to Conflict Countries: Moving Forward
This study outlines a novel framework through which to analyse China’s engagement in conflict-ridden countries. First, from the historic view, China’s approach is underpinned by the principles of state sovereignty and non-interference. This foundation is principled, as well as rhetorical and pragmatic. That is, China has actively pursued the mutual respect of these principles in its foreign relations, particularly with contested governments in the developing world. It is principled, in that it has formed a core logic of China’s foreign policy for decades despite fluctuations and changes in rhetoric. It is rhetorical in that it is applied in virtually all of China’s foreign diplomatic dealings. China’s engagements in Sudan and Myanmar are no exception. The language employed in China’s proposed peace plans in Darfur, Rakhine, and northern Myanmar underscore the centrality of these principles. Further evidence can also be drawn from China’s activism within multilateral forums, like the United Nations, on behalf of the Sudanese and Myanmar governments. In both instances, China asserted these states’ right to national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-interference. Beijing also actively pursued policies in both cases that advocated for local solutions, rather than the internationalizing of conflict. Because China represented the primary international partner to both the Sudanese and Myanmar governments, localized solutions for peace solidified Beijing’s leadership and influence over the peace process. It also reduced the threat of non-consensual humanitarian intervention into regional conflicts which would have had normative consequences (such as the normalization of humanitarian intervention at the expense of national sovereignty) and security consequences (Western influence on China’s border).
The use of sovereignty and non-interference principles is also pragmatic because, despite China’s rhetorical emphasis on these principles, they are loosely defined in practice. This pragmatic application of these principles enabled China to apply a more flexible definition of “interference” when it pressured the Sudanese government to acquiesce and consent to a UN proposal for an integrated peacekeeping mission in Darfur. This is also reflected in China’s active diplomatic, political, economic, and military support for ethnic militias in Kachin and Shan in order to secure their western border with Myanmar. It remains to be determined whether China considers these actions to have constituted “interference” in the domestic affairs of another sovereign state. Perhaps, pragmatism, in these contexts, trumped idealism in pursuit of China’s goals. Regardless, China’s pragmatism is acutely reflected in its broader approach of “groping for stones to cross the river,” which emphasizes the role of gradualism and experimentation in its foreign policy.
This research presents four core characteristics of China’s approach which have emerged in its response to the Darfur crisis and which were consistent in its subsequent response to internal conflicts in Myanmar: (1) a strong central state, (2) state-led development, (3) the use of multilateral and regional institutions in resolving conflicts and creating peace, and (4) physical reconstruction of the country. First, China advocates a state-led process toward peace which emphasizes the right of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-interference from external powers. Beijing extends economic, political, diplomatic, humanitarian and military support to strengthen the role, capacity, and legitimacy of the state. Second, China underscores the centrality of state-led national development as the pathway toward peace. To this end, China supports the state’s capacity to institute national development interventions aimed at reducing poverty, repairing damaged infrastructure, improving industry, and offering services. Third, China pursues peacebuilding through multilateral and international platforms and institutions. This reduces the likelihood of western intervention and ensures that state consent drives external contributions to development (whether peacekeeping, peacebuilding, or humanitarian assistance). Furthermore, it engages regional actors (e.g. ASEAN or the African Union) to contribute to local peacebuilding activities or, in the case of peacekeeping, provide intra rather than extra-regional peacekeepers. The final characteristic of China’s approach is investing in state-led, national reconstruction of war-torn areas, through bilateral and multilateral investments, development assistance, humanitarian aid, and other forms of assistance (academic scholarships, technical training, etc.).
There were also key changes which occurred in the evolution of China’s approach over time. First, China’s engagement in Darfur was marked by high-level engagement between senior politicians and diplomats. While some might argue China’s presence on-the-ground vis-à-vis its peacekeepers in Darfur reflected an active localized role in responding to the conflict, this role is dwarfed by the impact of China’s political intervention to bring Omar al-Bashir to the table. Darfur, in this view, was more about protecting state sovereignty and reaffirming the state’s right to non-interference rather than protecting civilians from atrocities. Indeed, only when the latter threatened the legitimacy of the former, Beijing intervened politically. But, in Myanmar, China’s approach evolved to include a greater degree of both high-level and local engagement. By positioning itself as the primary interlocutor and de-facto guarantor (due to its regional and economic significance), China was deeply engaged on the ground, negotiating with both state and non-state actors to advance the peace process (and its own economic interests as observed in the Myitsone dam project) Second, China’s approach to peacebuilding evolved from reliance on multilateral and international institutions in Sudan to more localized solutions for peace in Myanmar. In Sudan, China’s strategy was predicated on the use of multilateral and bilateral mechanisms for peacebuilding, such as the African Union and UN Peacekeeping. Meanwhile, in Myanmar, Beijing’s approach, while advocating for Myanmar’s sovereignty and right to non-interference in the UNSC, has resisted any form of external intervention into the process. It has utilized its positioning to prevent western states from assuming a salient role in the peace process. This transition from multilateral to local could be driven by a variety of factors including an evolution of its experience in conflict-ridden countries and the geostrategic significance of Myanmar in Beijing’s foreign policy as a peripheral.
China’s approach to conflict-ridden countries is also not static, the core characteristics present across time and geography in Sudan and Myanmar provide an important analytical framework for better understanding the logic of Chinese engagement. This framework, however, could benefit from further testing, field work, and qualitative interviews with government officials and actors engaged in the peace processes in Sudan and Myanmar. Important future developments to this area of research should also include an analysis of Syria and the Gaza war as additional case studies.
As the Syrian peace process unfolds, China is actively supporting Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad. The author’s first-hand observations and previous field research on China’s engagement in the peace process suggest the continuity of the core characteristics identified in this study in the Syria context.[1] For example, China has actively supported the Syrian government’s position during the decade-long civil war as the legitimate sovereign over the war-torn country. In the UN Security Council, China has assumed a more controversial stance in favour of the Syrian government, vetoing eight UN resolutions alongside Russia, which called for regional ceasefires with Syrian opposition forces and sanctions on the Syrian government.[2] The continuation of this approach is increasingly risky, however, since the civil war is now comprised of numerous international actors, including Turkey, the United States, and Russia. Beijing is increasingly contending with other great powers over the future of Syria. China has also been actively fundraising for Syrian reconstruction, to an estimated $400 billion. By strengthening bilateral, economic, and political ties with the Syrian government, Beijing has provided the Syrian state with a lifeline despite the imposition off crippling, US-led economic sanctions.
While the Syria case merits further study, it draws an important two concluding observations. First, China has yet to engage militarily in an internationalized civil war like Syria or Libya. While it may play a more tacit or distant role in facilitating peace through diplomacy, it remains to be seen how China will engage in situations where the political stakes are higher. In both Sudan and Myanmar, while weathering fierce international criticism, China was successful in asserting greater influence over the peace process, lending significant support to both contested regimes. However, the scale of international participation in and support for civil war in these cases was minimal. But, in a situation like Libya or Syria, international engagement is not only bifurcated at the international level (often over support for an existing regime), interstate contestation is reflected in the organization of non-state and state actors on the battlefield itself. This will test the degree to which China’s approach is will shift toward more defensive or offensive positions in pursuit of protecting a contested government.
Secondly, as a newly-minted great power wielding considerable influence at the regional and international level, China’s approach to peacebuilding and engagement in conflict-affected regions could play a salient role in redefining traditional norms, means, and mechanisms of peacebuilding. For many observers, it provides an alternative to the long-standing liberal approach. It does not appear, however, that China’s global push for development is predicated exclusively upon a defensive basis—that is, distinctly creating an alternative model of development. Rather, one could argue quite thoughtfully that the driving force behind its global development emphasis is a retrospective enthusiasm over its own domestic development experience. Certainly, China did what few other countries have been able to accomplish in relatively short period of time. For outside observers, this has reinforced a sense of Chinese exceptionalism in the Beijing Consensus. Exceptionalism in China’s case could better be classified as its uniqueness. China’s development experience is not replicable. Most developing countries lack the industrial capacity, labour force, technological capacity, and basic infrastructure to achieve such an end—even with China’s assistance.
As a whole, China’s unprecedented rise is likely to intensify global narratives of Chinese exceptionalism, which will exacerbate existing cleavages in international politics and reinforce gridlock within the UN Security Council concerning the pathway toward peace in ongoing civil wars. While China’s approach offers an attractive pathway to peace through development, it simultaneously challenges the existing global governance mechanisms employed to protect civilians by privileging the state over the individual. China’s state-led approach leads it to support states actively engaging in conflict against civilians. While China’s view of development addressed its own domestic poverty, developing as peacebuilding cannot overlook socio-political drivers of civil war or even the complicity of contested states in mass atrocities. While there are many commonalities between cases, Myanmar, Darfur, and Syria share the thread of state-led violence (in addition to violence derived from non-state actors) which produced widespread civilian casualties. In each case, the state played a role. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, now-deposed Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, and the Myanmar government all face accusations of atrocities against their own civilians. China’s engagement in Myanmar and Sudan reflects Beijing’s willingness to exert pressure on governments when their actions undermine peace. However, the question remains, what happens when the consequences of political violence outweigh a desire for development in a country emerging from violent conflict? Through the lens of global governance, this has significant normative implications for the continuity of the international human protection regime, which is undermined each time Beijing protects a state engaged in violence against civilians. This is perhaps the one of the more challenging dilemmas China will face moving forward.
[1] Jesse Marks, “In the Competition over Syria’s Reconstruction, China Is the Likely Winner,” Defense One, March 2, 2018. https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/03/competition-over-syrias-reconstruction-china-likely-winner/146366/.
[2] From 2011 to 2019, China vetoed eight UN Security Council resolutions concerning the Syrian civil war. See UN Draft Resolutions: S/2019/961; S/2019/756; S/2017/17; S/2016/1026; S/2014/348; S/2012/538; S/2012/77; S/2011/612;