A look at China's support for refugees
China’s engagement with UNHCR and global refugee protection efforts presents a stark contrast between its diplomatic rhetoric and its actual contributions. In a recent statement at the 75th Session of the UNHCR Executive Committee, Ambassador Chen Xu reaffirmed China’s commitment to multilateralism and the protection of displaced persons, calling for increased global support for UNHCR, deeper cooperation on root causes of displacement, and the use of emerging technologies to enhance humanitarian efforts. However, while Beijing frames itself as a responsible stakeholder in addressing refugee crises, its actions remain far less substantive than those of its Western counterparts and even some of its Asian neighbors.
Financial Commitments: Falling Short of Expectations
One of the most glaring gaps between China’s rhetoric and its actual support for UNHCR lies in financial contributions. Ambassador Chen Xu urged the international community to increase financial assistance to UNHCR, emphasizing the urgent need to bridge the humanitarian funding gap. Yet, China itself remains a minor donor to the agency, providing far less than major Western countries and other developed Asian nations such as Japan. While China touts its Global Development and South-South Cooperation Fund as an alternative mechanism for refugee assistance, the scope and scale of these projects remain unclear, and they do not directly address the immediate humanitarian needs of refugees.
A direct comparison of China’s and Japan’s financial contributions to UNHCR over the past eight years highlights this disparity:
The numbers are staggering:
In every year, Japan’s contributions are at least 20 times larger than China’s, often exceeding 100 times more (e.g., 2018: Japan $120 million vs. China $1.2 million).
China’s funding peaked in 2017 at $11.1 million but has fluctuated significantly, while Japan has maintained a steady and increasing level of funding.
Even private donors in Japan raised $73.8 million in 2023, far exceeding China’s entire national contribution in any given year.
China’s financial contributions to UNHCR pale in comparison to its geopolitical ambitions, raising questions of whether its support is more performative than practical. Beijing’s rhetoric suggests a commitment to strengthening UNHCR’s capacity, but China avoids any significant investment in refugee aid, instead shifting the responsibility onto Western nations, arguing that those "responsible for the refugee problem" should lead in funding humanitarian responses. This narrative allows China to position itself as a Global South leader, to win support of fellow “developing countries” while sidestepping the responsibilities of a great power. However, for refugee hosting countries, like Jordan, Lebanon, or Bangladesh, it offers no real financial alleviation.
China’s actual acceptance of refugees is another area where its rhetoric does not match reality. Despite being the world’s second-largest economy and a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China hosts only about 1,160 registered refugees—an astoundingly small number when compared to its population and resources. Of these, roughly 340 refugees come from Somalia, Syria, Afghanistan, and Yemen.
Moreover, China lacks a domestic asylum system, leaving UNHCR to handle refugee registration and status determination in its absence. While China regularly praises UNHCR’s work and stresses the need for political solutions to displacement, it has not established a legal framework for asylum-seekers, forcing them into a state of limbo. Even within Asia, China’s approach stands in stark contrast to Japan and South Korea, which, despite being more restrictive than Western nations, offer greater financial contributions and structured asylum processes.
China’s refugee policy prioritizes long-term stability and economic development over immediate humanitarian relief. In his UNHCR speech, Ambassador Chen Xu underscored Beijing’s belief that displacement stems from root causes—war, conflict, and economic inequality—that must be addressed through development. China’s domestic poverty reduction efforts, he argued, offer a model for how development assistance can support refugee integration. In practice, this translates into Beijing favoring infrastructure projects and economic investments in refugee-hosting countries.
This approach mirrors China’s broader foreign policy agenda, particularly under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Global Development Initiative (GDI). But while development can support durable solutions, it does little to alleviate the immediate suffering of displaced populations. Beijing’s emphasis on long-term growth overlooks the urgency of life-saving humanitarian assistance—still the cornerstone of the UNHCR’s mandate.
At the same time, Beijing seeks to position itself as a peacemaker in the very conflicts driving displacement.
Chinese leaders increasingly portray China as a mediator in global crises, particularly those fueling mass refugee flows. In his remarks, Ambassador Chen highlighted Beijing’s role in promoting political settlements and ceasefires, especially in Gaza and broader Middle Eastern conflicts. Without enforcement mechanisms or sustained political commitment, Beijing’s interventions play only a small role in facilitating de-escalation. Instead, regional powers such as Saudi Arabia have carried the burden of negotiation and implementation.
China’s close relationships with regimes accused of human rights abuses and contibuting to displacement further complicate its image. Its ongoing support for Bashar al-Assad’s government—one of the largest sources of forced displacement globally—raises doubts about its commitment to refugee protection. While Beijing publicly supports the rights of refugees, it consistently avoids criticizing the very regimes responsible for mass displacement, including many of its strategic partners. This selective silence undermines China’s credibility as a reliable advocate for displaced populations in active conflicts.
Move Beyond A Performative Role
There is always space for China to do more burden-sharing when it comes refugees. China’s engagement with UNHCR should move beyond rhetoric and into substantive action. While Beijing frequently calls for greater multilateral cooperation and praises UNHCR’s work, it should back of these statements with meaningful financial support, refugee resettlement, or legal protections for asylum seekers. This means broadening its approach from simply emphasizing development aid over direct humanitarian assistance and pushing responsibility onto other nations.
If China genuinely seeks to enhance its global standing in refugee governance, it should take concrete actions that align with its rhetoric:
Significantly increasing its financial contributions to UNHCR to match its status as a global power.
Developing a structured asylum framework that provides legal protections for displaced persons.
Accepting and resettling more refugees, especially from conflicts where China has political and economic stakes.
Ensuring that its diplomatic efforts in conflict mediation lead to concrete outcomes rather than broad rhetorical commitments..
China could actually reinforce its role as a global leader in humanitarian response, but it means assuming more responsibility.