China's Approach to Darfur: 2003-2010 (Paper 4)
China’s increasing role in conflict-affected countries has played a critical role in UN peace operations as a troop contributing country, development partner, and political advocate. However, it is distinctly challenging to define the implicit policy that China and Sudan have shared over sixty years of diplomatic relations. China has staked considerable interest in weathering decades of political risk and tumultuous international politics surrounding its influence and relations with the Sudanese Government. These long-standing relationships have been discussed at length in various papers explicitly discussing China’s role in Sudan over the decades. This section offers a description and analysis of China’s approach to Sudan’s Darfur conflict explicitly through the lens of global governance and peacebuilding. This section will conclude with a comprehensive theoretical framework that identifies the core characteristics of China’s approach to conflict-ridden countries with Darfur as a bench mark for testing the degree of change over time.
I. China-Sudan Relations
For decades, Sudan was plagued by a center-periphery contestation between Sudan’s ethnic and religious minorities on the periphery and the Arab-dominated state. Darfur is a region rich in diverse linguistic and ethnic groups. Most tend to oversimplify the divide between Arabic-speaking tribes and “black” Darfurians, but, in reality, the ethnic complexity of Darfur made it a melting pot of ethnic and national identities. Because of its geographic positioning, the region was often subjected to instability emerging from neighboring Chad and Libya, in addition to the Sudanese government. A loosely-affiliated group of Arabic-speaking tribes known as a Janjaweed became a primary check on Darfur opposition groups which emerged during previous periods of civil war. In 2003, violence broke out in the Darfur region of Western Sudan between Darfur opposition groups—the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM), the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), and Sudanese state-linked forces, primarily a government-backed Janjaweed. State forces and their proxies ravaged Darfur, terrorizing civilians, displacing millions, and killing over 300,000 Darfurians.
As a primary political partner to Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir and the National Congress Party, China’s political position at the onset of the Darfur Crisis (2003-present) brought it significant scrutiny and global criticism. China’s engagement with Sudan and its subsequent intervention into Darfur marks one of China’s first and most contentious engagements in Africa. While China engaged in numerous UN peacekeeping operations across the continent, Sudan’s salience to the international political landscape and the global discussion of normative intervention under the global human protection regime cannot be understated. Thus, for this paper, Sudan provides a strong baseline for understanding the core components of China’s approach to engagement in conflict-affected regions.
China’s engagement in Sudan prior to Darfur was predicated upon political and economic arrangements. China’s increasing need for oil reserves in the late 1990s drove an overseas pursuit of oil in Africa. Sudan’s nascent oil industry, left in the dust during two periods of bloody civil war and western sanctions, offered China a cheap and effective investment at a relatively low cost due to the state’s fragile conditions. Sudan therefore not only presented a lucrative national resource opportunity for China, but Beijing’s existing relations with Khartoum stretched several decades, built largely on Sudan’s purchase of Chinese arms at the height of Sudan’s second civil war (1983-2005). Beijing played a critical role in shielding the Sudanese regime from international punitive actions through political activism in the United Nations and by providing a life-line to Khartoum through economic aid and assistance. This played an important role in enabling the Sudanese government to weather Western sanctions, which forced most of the major Western companies from Sudan’s oil market, paving the way for Chinese state industries to dominate Sudan’s oil industry.
Beyond political and economic support, China was also large-scale supplier of military equipment and weapons transfers for the Sudanese military. While Soviet weapons comprised nearly two-thirds of arms transfers to Sudan[1], the significance of China’s military and weapons sales to Sudan cannot be overstated. From 2003 to 2006, China’s volume of small arms sales to Sudan made it the country’s largest supplier, averaging $14 million annually. Chinese supplied aircraft, tanks, equipment, and arms were also employed by Sudanese military in operations in Darfur.[2] The UN Security Council imposed an arms embargo on Darfur in 2004 (which subsequently expanded in 2005), preventing the transfer of any weapons to the Darfur region for all actors—state and non-state.[3] In 2007, Human Rights Watch accused China of breaking the arms embargo when Chinese weapons were reportedly redirected to Darfur.[4] A UN panel confirmed these reports in 2010 after an investigation into the illicit flow of arms into the region.[5]
II. China’s Approach to the Darfur Crisis
China’s policy concerning Darfur was not fixed. Rather, it was a dynamic effort to balance China’s stance on non-interference and national sovereignty with the realization of its role vis-à-vis the Sudanese Government to loosely intervene politically to pressure the Sudanese government to pursue peace or, at the least, a cessation of hostilities in Darfur. And, when Sudan acquiesced to Chinese pressure, China took a leading role in the intervention to ensure it reduced the threat of humanitarian intervention, respected the sovereignty of the Sudanese state, and, finally, promoted development as the long-term solution to the war.
When violence in Darfur worsened in 2003, China remained silent and inactive for nearly a year. Choosing a position of neutrality in support of the Sudanese state, they resigned themselves from any role that might infringe on Sudan’s sovereignty. One Chinese scholar argued China’s inaction was the result of the Sudanese government’s persuading Chinese officials that the violence in Darfur was local violence being contained by the state.[6] However, as reports of violence reached the United States and Europe, international activism toward international action in Sudan emerged, most saliently from Secretary General Kofi Annan. China opposed such action and, until 2004, actively lobbied to keep Darfur off of the UNSC agenda.[7] In China’s view, Darfur was a civil conflict that was the right and responsibility of the Sudanese state to address. Any and all UN efforts, in this view, were only legitimate if provided with the consent of and in support to the Bashir government. However, international criticism was actively adopting a contrarian tone. China positioned itself between the international community and the Sudanese government in an absolutist stance on state sovereignty and non-interference. This protectionism occurred not only through continued economic support for the state, but also politically through multilateral institutions.
On November 19th 2004, the UN Security Council met to debate Resolution 1547 which encouraged final peace talks to end the 2nd Civil War, and encourage a cessation of hostilities in Darfur. From the onset, China extended its support for the Sudanese government by pushing against the inclusion of Darfur and insisting that the resolution address peace between the Sudanese government and southern opposition forces. In the end, while the resolution primarily addressed the CPA, the Resolution passed with Darfur’s inclusion and established the UN Advanced Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), calling for a cessation in hostilities in western Sudan.
China exercised its authority as a UN Security Council Member to support the Sudanese state within the UN security council. This occurred through two primary actions. First, China actively argued for softer language in resolutions targeting the state, removing any references that could justify the implementation of a Chapter VII mandate for intervention. It also abstained on other primary resolutions that targeted the state. This included Resolution 1556 (July, 2004) for the disarmament of the Janjaweed, an investigation, Resolution 1564 (September, 2004) which threatened UN economic sanctions against the government, as well as several others calling for measures to address human rights violators.[8] Of these, perhaps the most salient is China’s final abstention in August, 2006 over Resolution 1706 which expanded the UNMIS’ Chapter VII mandate to include “use all necessary means” to protect civilians.[9]
China’s UN advocacy in support of the Sudanese state revolves significantly around the question of military intervention under the framework of R2P.[10] The nature of the conflict was contested by China, Russia, and the Arab League who argued that the complexity of the Darfur had evolved into civil war, rather than a simplification of the crisis as Arab perpetrators killing “African” victims.[11] By diverting any formal recognition of Darfur as a genocide, it would, at least under the international human protection regime, not necessitate humanitarian intervention. Rather, other UN-sanctioned options could, in China’s view, effectively address the crisis in Darfur. More specifically, intervention should be development-focused and uphold Sudanese sovereignty. Instead of a military intervention, the Darfur crisis required an integrated UN peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and development approach to support the Sudanese state’s capacity to solve the conflict and create a durable peace. The responsibility to oversee these efforts should also fall on the UN Security Council and be linked to greater inclusion of regional actors, specifically the African Union, into the peace process.[12]
The second issue arising from the debate over R2P and humanitarian convention was a commitment problem. Despite US and European insistence on the scale of violence, even terming it a “genocide,” the international rhetoric over civilian atrocities never translated into direct intervention. In this sense, China’s insistence for a multilateral, integrated approach - which carried the consent of the Sudanese government - was relatively successful, even if this was at the expense of its own “non-interventionist” stance, whereby China would be instrumental in pressuring Sudan to cooperate.[13]
As early as 2005, China slowly shifted its stance from one of neutrality to a more active role in bringing the Sudanese government to the negotiating table over Darfur. Verhoeven et al argued that China “took time to change from unfailing support for Khartoum to a more engaged role, but once it became clear that regime change was not an option for the White House, Beijing began shifting in 2005.[14]” More specifically, China placed greater pressure on the state to solve the Darfur conflict. At the opening of a new Chinese oil refinery in late 2016, Hu Jintao called on Sudan to strengthen its dialogue with all partners to coordinate stances and push toward a solution.[15] Again four months later, it was reported that President Hu expressly told Bashir during a trip to Khartoum that Sudan should more actively pursue a solution to Darfur.[16]
On February 3, 2007, Hu Jintao put forward four principles for a solution to the Darfur conflict, its most direct and highest-level contribution to the international political debate: (a) respect for Sudanese sovereignty and territorial integrity, (b) peaceful solutions and equality-based coordination/dialogue, (c) the integrated role of both the UN and African Union to improve the function of a peacekeeping mission, and (d) the improvement of the living conditions for locals in Darfur. He also announced China’s donation of $5.2 million in humanitarian assistance to Darfur. Shortly after, China appointed Liu Guijin as the Special Envoy to Sudan. China’s impetus was for Sudan to accept a proposal by Kofi Anna for a joint UN/African Union peacekeeping mission. China’s increased engagement in Khartoum and in the UN helped effectively pressure Bashir to consent to a joint peacekeeping operation. In July 2007, the UN Security Council authorized the UN Advanced Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). It also secured a military peacekeeping force which would have a more distinctly African representation, reducing the risk or fear of an overly “Western” comprised force.
Through this success, China was able to prevent a UN-sanctioned military intervention into Darfur by pursuing a multilateral option through the UN which both upheld Sudan’s sovereignty and brandished the state’s consent. However, in doing so, China’s role in Darfur shifted from political persuader to active troops-on-the-ground through the joint UN-AU peacekeeping force. Beijing also assumed a greater, albeit comparatively small compared to other donor states, role in providing humanitarian and developmental assistance. In 2008, Chinese Sudan Envoy Liu Guijin outlined projects and aid totaling some $50 million for Darfur including 85 km of water pipelines, water wells, and water containers as well as humanitarian assistance to IDP camps.[17] Qian and Wu rightly point out that China’s role in Darfur has extended far beyond peacekeeping and has included a broad range of development and aid projects which are often overlooked.[18] These, they note, include the construction of a Darfur dam, critical infrastructure projects, schools, and other forms of development aid.[19]
III. Benchmarking Darfur: A New Framework for Chinese Intervention
Darfur is one of the first examples where we can pin point a convergence of international development, state-building, security, multilateral diplomacy, and military intervention in China’s foreign policy. China’s engagement in Darfur provides the basis for a new framework for evaluating China’s approach to peacebuilding in war-torn states. This framework provides both a normative and theoretical view of China’s guiding principles as well as four core characteristics of China’s approach in practice.
Theoretically, China’s approach to peacebuilding in war-torn countries is guided by two overarching principles: state sovereignty and non-interference. State sovereignty, in China’s view, is conceptualized within the Westphalian tradition, where the state holds authority to govern over a delineated period of territory. Ayoob bifurcates this role into a state’s external autonomy and internal authority.[20] A state’s internal authority is its right to rule over both the territory and those who fall within it. It sets the geographic parameters of state authority. Meanwhile, a state’s external autonomy refers to non-interference, the reciprocity inherent in and required by a functioning ecosystem of mutually-respecting sovereignty states.
China’s grasp of the Westphalian model of sovereignty, both in the organization of its own governance and its engagement in the global order, reinforces an often-contrary view than the more liberal interpretation of sovereignty defined under the Responsibility to Protect, in which individuals matter just as much as or more than the state. China’s international activism on behalf of Sudan is predicated on these two principles. More specifically, Chinese diplomacy pursued the mutual respect of these principles for Sudan. China’s impetus on these is introspective, in that by advocating for mutual respect for national sovereignty and non-interference, China seeks to protect its right to govern domestically as it chooses, without threat or fear of interference in its domestic affairs. A critical component of this is China’s right to choose its own pathway for national development and growth, free from the threat of Western influence or the “shock therapy” (which describes the rapid and disruptive transformation of post-Soviet countries into liberalized, free-market economies) it observed among many of its neighbors at the outset of the Cold War. The right for a state to exercise its sovereignty to pursue its own national development agenda, free from the threat of interference or external pressure, is a cornerstone of China’s stated position toward global development.
Beijing’s rhetoric regarding these two principles is foundational in its foreign diplomacy and its foreign relations. That said, as China has engaged more directly in countries facing violent conflict, its adherence to this political orthodoxia is relatively flexible. As China has intervened into conflicts to create durable peace, it has, at times, exercised a more flexible approach to non-interference in situations where adherence would exacerbate an existing conflict and threaten the sovereignty of the state as is observed in Sudan and Myanmar. That does not necessarily mean that these principles are purely rhetorical. Rather, in pursuit of advocating these principles, China has had to take a more assertive role, vis-à-vis partner governments in conflict zones, through political and diplomatic pressure. This, however, should be viewed through the lens of pragmatism rather than an abrogation of political orthodoxia.
Moving from theory to practice, while China initially opted to stay outside the conflict, its approach gradually evolved from neutrality to intervention through a process of experimentation and gradualism. This exemplifies a primary characteristic of China’s foreign policy, its pragmatism and ability to learn. As Beijing assumed a more active role concerning Darfur by 2005, China unrolled a broad strategy for ending the crisis and creating peace. Its approach emphasized four characteristics: (1) strong central state, (2) state-led development, (3) the use of multilateral and regional institutions to implement peace operations (peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding), and (4) physical reconstruction.
Nearly two decades after the Darfur crisis first broke out, China remains actively involved in the region. Its emphasis on development as the root of peacekeeping and peacebuilding, Rosemary Foot suggests, explains why Beijing remains engaged in a country “[for] a long time once it is committed to a peace operation.[21]” However, China’s core vision for peacebuilding, as outlined by Chinese UN Deputy Ambassador Shen Guofang in 2001, had not been accurately employed in a conflict-affected country until Sudan. Furthermore, China’s initial response, while advocating for its core principles of sovereignty and non-interference, provided no space for development. Instead, its support for the Sudanese government produced Sewall’s “state as constraint” problem.[22] Namely, the Sudanese state was not pursuing any form of peacebuilding in Darfur, nor was it pursuing peace. The insistence on state-led violence prompted western criticism, which was directed on China for its continuing support of Omar al-Bashir’s government. Whether this was to protect its normative principles or preserve its political-economic relationship with Sudan (probably a mix of both), it undoubtedly forced China to realize it would have to loosen its grasp on “non-interference” in order to rein in the Sudanese state while systemically opposing any form of UN military intervention under R2P.
China, instead, pursued a middle ground stance. Firstly, peace in Darfur could not be achieved without the Sudanese government as the sovereign state. China’s activism in the UN emphasized this as an absolute in any UN action taken in Darfur. Secondly, peace in Darfur would require a military force, but that force should not be the result of non-consensual intervention. China’s resistance to the term “genocide” was predicated on a fear that, under R2P and the emerging civilian protection regime, western actors might militarily intervene. Instead, China pursued the multilateral option, a UN peacekeeping force, which had been proposed previously by the UN Security Council. However, the only way the Sudanese government would consent was (a) through increased Chinese pressure and (b) if it was comprised of a largely regional African Union force. Thirdly, peace in Darfur would only be sustainable if efforts to create it emphasized the foundational role of development, specifically development guided by the state. Hu Jintao and numerous senior Chinese officials emphasized the development-conflict nexus through their engagements on Darfur. It also guided their peacebuilding and peacekeeping interactions in Darfur from 2007 and beyond. And, finally, peace in Darfur could only be secured long-term if it promoted long-term development and reconstruction. Founded on China’s own national development strategy, the aim of peacebuilding is to eliminate the underlying cause of conflict. And, in China’s view, this would eliminate the underlying causes of conflict in Darfur.
IV. A Comprehensive Framework
Conclusively, the normative and core characteristics which define China’s approach to conflict countries can be extracted from China’s engagement in Darfur. Normatively, China’s policy is underpinned by a strong state sovereignty position which reinforces a persistence in ensure a state’s right to interference. From this position, we observe four core characteristics emerge:
Strengthen the role, capacity, and legitimacy of the sovereign state.
China supports the state-in-conflict through a variety of economic, political, diplomatically, and military mechanisms. First, it strengthens a regime’s ability to survive by offering aid and assistance, which enables the state to weather external pressure (particularly sanctions) and work to implement economic projects which aim to develop war-torn regions. Second, Beijing’s advocacy at the regional and international level aims to impede non-consensual coercive actions (e.g. humanitarian intervention or economic sanctions) which might emerge within the UN against the contested regime. Third, China reinforces the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the contested regime, calling for a peacebuilding process that is state-led or under state-consent. Finally, in the case of Sudan, China provided military units to UNAMID and assistance to the UN peacekeeping force to ensure that there was agreed-upon military force that is staffed largely by regional forces instead of international forces.
Underscore the centrality of national development through a government-owned and led process.
Development is the pathway to reduce poverty and address core root causes. It is the primary responsibility of the state to choose its own development path, which China would help stand-up.
Utilize multilateral institutions (both regional and international) to ensure the process is owned locally and ensures greater checks against western intervention into civil conflicts.
China’s particular interest in multilateral regimes, for the purpose of democratizing international relations, enables China to pursue its interests with a reduced risk for hegemonic checks. Furthermore, it balances the need for external intervention by reducing the risk of UN-led humanitarian intervention under R2P by, instead, enabling regional bodies to fill the gap. This creates a more palatable solution for the contested state who would be more inclined for UN peacekeeping forces comprised of regional forces rather than international forces.
Invest in a state-led national reconstruction of war-torn areas through bilateral and multilateral investment and engagement.
This enables China to engage bilaterally with the state and pursue economic interests under the framework of development cooperation. Reconstruction in this context refers to the physical reconstruction of damaged infrastructure, industry, homes, and so on.
There are certainly limitations in the conclusions that can be drawn from single case study as complex as Darfur given the historic relationship of Sino-Sudanese relations, which the works of scholars like Peter Garretson and Daniel Large have detailed. One such limitation is the question of China’s motivations for persisting relations with Sudan, such a China’s economic and energy ambitions. These interests certainly play a role in China’s engagement with Sudan over Darfur, but are not covered in detail within this analysis. The nexus of China’s national interests and the pursuit of conflict-resolution requires further research beyond this paper. That said, this case is important to bench mark China’s first significant experience engaging in a conflict the scale and significance of Darfur, the core characteristics of which are helpful to mapping what Verhoeven et al define as the next “complicated phase of China’s ‘go out’ strategy” in which China deploys its Darfur experiences toward formulating new approaches to other conflicts, including Myanmar.[23] Recounting that this approach reflects China’s position from during the course of the Darfur crisis from 2003 to as late as 2010, the next chapter will compare this framework with China’s engagement in the Myanmar peace process from 2011 to 2017 to measure the continuity and change of core characteristics over a linear period of time.
[1] David Shinn, “China and the Conflict in Darfur,” The Brown Journal of World Affairs 16, no. 1 (Fall/Winter, 2009): 89, https://www.jstor.org/stable/24590742.
[2] Ibid, 88-91.
[3] SIPRI Weapons Transfer Database, “UN arms embargo on Sudan (Darfur region),” https://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/un_arms_embargoes/sudan. Accessed on April 22, 2020.
[4] Reuters, “China, Russia break Darfur arms embargo: Amnesty” Reuters, May 8, 2007, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sudan-russia-china/china-russia-breach-darfur-arms-embargo-amnesty-idUSL0864670120070508.
[5] Scarlet Kim, “Sudan Accused of Violating UN Arms Embargo,” Arms Control Association. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007-05/sudan-accused-violating-un-arms-embargo. Accessed on April 22, 2020.
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007-05/sudan-accused-violating-un-arms-embargo, Accessed on April 22, 2020.
[6] Jian Junbo, “China in the International Conflict-management: Darfur as a Case” in China’s role in International Conflict Management: Sudan and South Sudan, Global Review (Shanghai Institute for International Studies), 2012. https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/publications/719-chinas-role-in-international-conflict-management-sudan-and-south-sudan-global-review.
[7] Geoff Dyer, “We Are Not the World’s Savior,” in The Contest of the Century: The New Era of Competition with China—and How America Can Win (New York: Random House, 2014): 207.
[8] Medeiros, “China’s Foreign Policy Actions,” 178-182.
[9] UN Security Council, Resolution 1706- S/RES/1706, 2006. http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1706.
[10] This debate over intervention and R2P in the Sudan context is covered extensively in Harry Verhoeven, Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, and Mdhan Mohan Jaganathan, “To Intervene in Darfur, or Not: Re-examining the R2P and Its Impact,” Global Society 30, no. 1 (Nov. 2015): 21-37. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13600826.2015.1093464?needAccess=true.
[11] Ibid, 26.
[12] David Shinn, “China and the Conflict in Darfur,” 92.
[13] Ibid, 92; Daniel Large, “China's Sudan Engagement: Changing Northern and Southern Political Trajectories in Peace and War,” The China Quarterly, no. 199 (Sep, 2009): 619.
[14] Verhoeven et al, “To Intervene in Darfur, or Not,” 32.
[15] Reuters, “China’s Hu says understands Sudan’s Darfur concerns,” Sudan Tribune, November 2, 2006. https://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article18467.
[16] Opheera McDoom, “China’s Hu tells Sudan it must solve Darfur issue,” Reuters, February 3, 2007, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-africa-china/chinas-hu-tells-sudan-it-must-solve-darfur-issue-idUSMCD26133120070202.
[17] China Daily, “China envoy: more humanitarian aid to Darfur,” China Daily, February 26, 2008, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-02/26/content_6483392.htm.
[18] Jason Qian and Anne Wu, “China’s Delicate Role on Darfur,” Belfer Center, July 23, 2007. https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/chinas-delicate-role-darfur.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Mohammed Ayoob. “Humanitarian Intervention and State Security.” The International Journal of Human Rights 6, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 82, https://doi.org/10.1080/714003751.
[21] Foot, “China and the International Human Protection Regime,” 10.
[22] Sewall, “Peacebuilding and Global Governance,” 12-15.
[23] Verhoeven et al, “To Intervene in Darfur, or Not,” 33. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13600826.2015.1093464?needAccess=true