CHINA’S APPROACH TO MYANMAR: 2010-2020 (Paper 5)

China’s approach to the Darfur conflict contributed to China’s subsequent foreign policy and diplomacy toward Myanmar. In the post-Darfur period, China employed its lessons-learned in Sudan to enhance its role in global governance, including brokering peace in conflict-affected countries, particularly Myanmar. These practices have emphasised the continuity of four key normative characteristics: a strong state, the role of development, the significance of regional and multilateral institutions, and the role of national reconstruction (namely the concept of national development in practice).

This chapter explores China’s policy approach toward peace in Myanmar. It begins with a brief background on ethnic-state conflict in Myanmar before moving into an overview of China’s diplomatic engagements with Myanmar from 2011 to 2017 at the rise of the National League for Democracy (NLD). Then, it looks distinctly at China’s approach toward peace in two separate, but linked conflicts: The Kachin and Shan conflicts in northern Myanmar and the 2017 Rohingya crisis in Rakhine.

I. Civil War in Myanmar

The internal conflict in Myanmar began following Britain’s withdrawal in 1948, when Myanmar became an independent state according to demarcated colonial boundaries. Of these boundaries, the China-Myanmar boundary - along the Kachin and Shan borders - remained a controversial demarcation. China, despite territorial disputes, accepted the 1941 boundary drawn by the British, which left both the Chinese-dominated Kachin and Shan states in the Burmese government’s control. Minorities were effectively split between the two countries, creating a complex network of cross-border relations and interactions. More broadly, Myanmar has been embroiled in conflict on-and-off since independence in 1948. The first period of conflict lasted from 1948 to 1962 and primarily involved the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) and Karen National Union. The second period of war occurred from 1962 to 1988, when a coup overthrew the parliamentary government, driving ethnic groups to mobilize. In 1967, China intervened in the civil war at the height of the Cultural Revolution, providing support to the CPB resistance against the government.^[1] However, over the past decade, periods of intense violence between the government and Kachin and Shan ethnic groups has spilled over into neighboring China. The consistent threat of instability has prompted Chinese intervention into Myanmar’s internal conflict politically and militarily. From 2011 to early 2016, China’s relation with the government have been tenuous. However, the rise of National League for Democracy (NLD) and Aung san Suu Kyi produced a transformative period in Myanmar-Chinese relations which would provide Beijing a greater role in the national peace process.

II. China-Myanmar Relations: 2011-2020

China’s historic approach toward peace with Myanmar is based in the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence agreed to with Myanmar and India in 1954: (a) mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, (b) mutual non-aggression, (c) non-interference into internal affairs of the other, (d) equality and mutual benefit, and (e) peaceful coexistence.^[2] More recently, these principles were further clarified in the first bilateral meeting with Myanmar’s Suu Kyi in 2016. ^[3] Chinese Premier Li Keqiang then added that China supported Myanmar in choosing its own national development path; as well as efforts to promote national reconciliation, economic development, and improvement of people's livelihood. He further noted that China is willing to “consolidate mutual political trust” with Myanmar and strengthen exchanges and cooperation between all actors—government, parliament, political parties, military, localities, and social groups—and promote greater relational developments. Additionally, Li pushed the integration of Myanmar’s development strategy through cooperation with China’s regional development agenda, including cross-border oil/gas lines and other forms of infrastructure, trade, and public services; as well as advocating for increased multilateral engagement with ASEAN for regional development. To summarize, China’s policy toward peace in Myanmar is predicated on a policy of “persuading for peace and facilitating dialogues.^[4]”

From 2011 to 2016, China’s diplomatic approach has prioritized short-term stability through negotiated ceasefires through its appointed lead negotiator, the Special Envoy for Asian Affairs. China has used this platform and mechanism to directly intervene in the peace process to create ceasefire regimes on its borders. However, these ceasefires have proven elusive. China’s degree of engagement depends on the ebbs and flows of violence.^[5] Diplomatically, China actively pursued a neutral position between ethnic groups and the Myanmar government. However, in periods of distinct violence, China’s neutral position toward both the state and non-state actors enables it to create leverage by shifting some of its political weight to one side.^[6] This created concerns among state officials that Beijing provided support for ethnic militias in the border regions.^[7] The strain in diplomatic relations evidenced itself through a period of tumultuous political tit-for-tats, eventually contributing to a further deterioration of relations. More broadly, Myanmar accused China of interfering in the peace process (in an effort to undermine it), while China saw itself as the victim when the military-dominated state withdrew from bilateral economic and infrastructure projects as early as 2011.^[8]

After the NLD assumed power in Myanmar in March 2016, Aung San Suu Kyi reoriented Myanmar’s future toward China, with the aim of procuring Chinese investment and assistance for Myanmar’s national development. Over the following months, several high-level visits from Chinese political leaders appeared to signal a warming of relations, particularly in regard to the security situation in northern Myanmar. During Suu Kyi’s first high level meeting to Beijing while in power, China emphasized its eagerness to support reconciliation and peace. The NLD’s early diplomatic posturing toward China induced a relative change-of-heart in Beijing who sought to improve bilateral ties with Myanmar and build on this toward a peaceful resolution to the Kachin conflict. In the latter months of 2016, China ramped up its support for the peace process through financial contributions, expanding diplomatic engagement with both state and non-state actors, and putting the weight of its political support behind the state-led process. Meanwhile, China continued pursuit of strategic balance gave them influence over both sides of the peace process and the ability to encourage the cooperation of non-state actors in the 2015 national ceasefire agreement and the 2016 Union Peace Process.  

III. China’s Approach to Northern Myanmar

China’s pursuit of peace in Myanmar was largely motivated by geostrategic, political, and economic interests.^[9] The continued instability between the military and armed ethnic groups has created continuous insecurity on China’s Yunnan border, which has primarily incentivized China’s political intervention into the peace process to secure ceasefires on the border. However, this has created periods of tension with the Myanmar government, whose periods of distrust and strained relations with China previously led to their withdrawal from numerous large-scale economic and infrastructure projects with China in 2011.^[10] It has created further concerns for China’s regional and international development (e.g. BRI) and threatened to limit China’s access to the Indian ocean. The threat of escalating violence risked incentivizing competing sides to pursue international support threatened to open the door to a Western influence on China’s western border.

China’s priority is stabilizing its border with Myanmar, and it has pursued this through cross-border relations with non-state actors in Kachin and Shan. Short-term stabilization emerged from fragile negotiated ceasefires between ethnic groups and the state. China has had to play mediator at times and aggressor in others. Meanwhile, a long-term comprehensive peace, while desirable, has taken significant time and effort. The first obstacle concerns the lack of a mutually agreed framework for peace and power-sharing between ethnic and state actors. The continual resurgence of conflict over decades signals significant cleavages between expectations of armed ethnic groups and the state. In 2015, China signed the national ceasefire agreement as an international witness to peace between eight of 15 warring ethnic groups and Myanmar’s government.^[11] One year later, widescale ethnically linked violence erupted in Rakhine, complicating the pursuit of a comprehensive peace. And, while China is well-positioned as a primary proponent of the peace process to facilitate this, it is unlikely China will deeply entangle itself in the politics of ethnic violence beyond political pressure and facilitating peace talks. It will instead defer this role to the state.

The second obstacle concerns intragovernmental rivalry between Suu Kyi’s civilian-led government and Myanmar military. ^[12] The lack of consensus within the state apparatus on the appropriate policy toward ethnic groups creates an unpredictable, fragile peace process which casts shadows over the sustainability of national peacebuilding efforts. Still, China’s neutrality has enabled it to build pragmatic, useful relationships with both state and non-state actors. This strategic balance has slowly enabled Beijing to “soften its reputation” in the country while increasing its strategic influence in the peace process as the leading external actor.^[13]

The continuity of intrastate conflict in Myanmar also heightens China’s apprehensions of western influence or intervention into Myanmar, creating undesired Western influence on its border. China has resisted any significant Western influence in the peace process and pushed against internationalizing the conflict in Kachin, which occurred in Darfur. Thus, in order to keep encroaching western influence at bay, China must maintain constructive advancement in the peace process to keep actors from pursuing UN or western assistance.

Furthermore, Yun argues that China sought to sustain its leverage “…by keeping the issue alive and shielding ethnic armed groups from destruction by the Myanmar military” in the event that one side pursued closer security ties with the United States.^[14]” This distinctive use of leverage raises questions about China’s non-interference policy and sovereignty. 

IV. China’s Approach to Rakhine

While this analysis does not explore the historic conflicts in the Rakhine state to a great extent, the latter period of conflict in Rakhine between the Myanmar military and the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) requires inclusion because China has exerted its position to intervene politically on behalf of the Myanmar government over the last three years.

Historically, the Rohingya are a Muslim majority ethnic group whose domestic status, for decades, has been in limbo. Because they are not a recognized ethnicity of Myanmar, they have limited access to citizenship, basic state services, or state protections from rights violations. For more on the background of the Rakhine conflict, the works of Ahmed et al and Ware et al provide a strong contextual overview on the events which produced the ongoing violence.[15] In short, in 2017, the NLD and the military came under fierce international criticism for reports of systematic ethnic cleansing, forced displacement, and genocide against Rohingya, many of whom have fled to Bangladesh and are settled in camps.^[16]

Since 2017, China has taken a more active stance in the international political debate over the Rohingya crisis. In late 2017, Beijing rolled out a three-point plan to address the Rohingya crisis: reach a ceasefire, strengthen Myanmar-Bangladesh bilateral dialogue, and develop Rakhine to prevent the resurgence of conflict. Through this framework, China has exerted its leadership in three ways. First, Beijing has secured external leadership over “peace” in Rakhine, working as Myanmar’s primary partner. As the existing de-facto “guarantor” of the comprehensive peace process in Kachin and Shan, China has expanded its role to address Rakhine. Its approach has been similar. Concerned over the risks of external intervention, Beijing has emphasized a regional solution to a regional problem, relying on bilateral negotiations between Myanmar and Bangladesh to cooperate over the increasing humanitarian and displacement crisis.

Second, China’s political support has also strengthened the position of the Myanmar government and military. The effect has enabled a state-led rebranding of the ongoing military operations in Rakhine as a counter-terrorism operation, rather than ethnic violence. Myanmar designated ARSA a terrorist organization in 2017. Suu Kyi, at a 2018 lecture in Singapore, characterized the Rakhine conflict as “terrorist activities” driving “intercommunal violence” and the Rohingya humanitarian crisis.^[17] Furthermore, China’s labelling ARSA a terrorist actor has reinforced the securitization of the crisis in Rakhine.^[18] Some have posited that China’s approach toward ARSA is influenced by its assertion that ARSA is networked with Uighur Islamist elements.^[19] By reframing the conflict in Rakhine as a counter-terrorism operation, any violence in Rakhine can be justified or, at least, explained away by the military within the framework of national security.

Finally, Beijing has shielded the Myanmar government from international criticism over its actions in Rakhine. Through its positioning within the UN Security Council, China has resisted the adoption of language in UN resolutions which could internationalize the conflict or produce a movement toward non-consensual, humanitarian intervention, despite criticism from high-level UN figures.^[20] By limiting international intervention into the conflict, China has actively maintained control over the political process, ensuring it remains the responsibility of regional actors. And, this has better positioned them, as a dominate influence in ASEAN, to pursue their geostrategic, political, and economic interests in Myanmar.

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[1] For information and background in China-Myanmar relations during the second period of civil war, see Robert Holmes, “China-Burma Relations since the Rift,” Asian Survey 12, no. 8 (Aug. 1972): 868-700. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2643109.

[2]  People’s Republic of China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,” July 30, 2014. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_665342/zwbd_665378/t1179045.shtml.

[3] People’s Republic of China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Li Keqiang Holds Talks with Myanmar ’s State Affairs and Administration Aung San Suu Kyi,” July 30, 2014. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cedk/chn/zgwj/t1390098.htm.

[4] Ibid;  Yun Sun, “China and Myanmar’s Peace Process,” United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 401, March 2017: 3. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR401-China-and-Myanmar-Peace-Process.pdf

[5] Yun Sun, “China and Myanmar’s Peace Process,” 3.

[6] Bertil Lintner, “Same Game, Different Tactics: China’s ‘Myanmar Corridor,’” The Irrawaddy, July 13, 2015. https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/same-game-different-tactics-chinas-myanmar-corridor.html.

[7] Lina Alexandra and Marc Lanteigne, “New Actors and Innovative Approaches to Peacebuilding: The Case of Myanmar,” in Rising Powers and Peacebuilding: Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017): 215.

[8] Yun Sun, “China and Myanmar’s Peace Process,” 4.

[9] USIP Senior Study Group, “China’s Role in Myanmar’s Internal Conflicts,” United States Institute of Peace, no.1 (Sep., 2018): 16-21.

[10] Yun Sun, “China and Myanmar’s Peace Process,” 4; Lina Alexandra and Marc Lanteigne, “New Actors and Innovative Approaches to Peacebuilding: The Case of Myanmar,” in Rising Powers and Peacebuilding: Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017): 214.

[11] Antoni Slodkowski, “Myanmar signs ceasefire with eight armed groups,” Reuters, October 15, 2015. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-politics/myanmar-signs-ceasefire-with-eight-armed-groups-idUSKCN0S82MR20151015

[12] Yun Sun, “China and Myanmar’s Peace Process,” 5.

[13] Lina Alexandra and Marc Lanteigne, “New Actors and Innovative Approaches to Peacebuilding: The Case of Myanmar,” in Rising Powers and Peacebuilding: Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017): 222.

[14] Yun Sun, “China and Myanmar’s Peace Process,” 5.

[15] For more information, see Kaweser Ahmed and Helal Mohiuffin, “The Rohingya Crisis: Analyses, Responses, and Peacebuilding Avenues (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2020). https://clio.columbia.edu/catalog/14608620; Anthony Ware and Costas Laoutides, “Myanmar’s ‘Rohingya’ Conflict,” (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2018). https://clio.columbia.edu/catalog/14465541.

[16] People’s Republic of China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “An Important Three-point Consensus Reached at an Informal Meeting Among China, Myanmar and Bangladesh,” September 28, 2018. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1601107.shtml.

[17] Aaron Low, “Rohingya crisis: terrorism may spread beyond Myanmar, Suu Kyi warns,” South China Morning Post, August 21, 2018. https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/2160716/rohingya-crisis-terrorism-may-spread-beyond-myanmar-suu-kyi-warns.

[18] Xinhua Net, “Terrorist arrested in Myanmar western state: police,” Xinhua News, April 8, 2019. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-04/08/c_137959579.htm.

[19] Lawi Weng, “China Warns Northern Alliance Against Cooperating with ASRSA,” The Irrawaddy, April 2, 2018. https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/china-warns-northern-alliance-cooperating-arsa.html.

[20] John Ciorciari, “The U.N.’s top court ordered Myanmar to protect the Rohingya. Here’s how that could matter,” Washington Post, February 10, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/02/10/uns-top-court-ordered-myanmar-protect-rohingya-heres-how-that-can-matter/.