China’s Evolving Approach to International Peacebuilding in Conflict-Ridden Countries

A Limited Paper Series

Global governance endeavors to address the mutual challenges that threaten international peace and security. Since the outset of the Cold War, the continuation of violent conflict in fragile regions across the world contribute to national and regional instability, producing economic collapse, displacement, reoccurring violence, proliferation of weapons, and terrorism. International peacebuilding efforts—a collection of organized interventions employed to end conflict and build durable peace—were designed to resolve these conflicts by addressing the underlying roots of the conflict.

The traditional model of international peacebuilding, which emerged in the post-war period, was defined in liberal terms—democratic political reform, open-economies, and rights-based governance. However, the advent of liberal interventionism which flowed from normative changes in perceptions of sovereignty enshrined in the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and the emergence of the international human protection regime undermined confidence in the peacebuilding model. For many in support of R2P, the widespread bloodshed and reports of genocide heightened interventionist tendencies. Meanwhile, traditional proponents of national sovereignty reinforced their ideological and political positions. Western-led interventions in the Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Libya, and more reinforced fear and criticism over the perceived violations of state sovereignty and non-interference into war-torn countries. These debates still proliferate in the halls of the United Nations and multilateral fora as well as the battlefields on which intrastate wars were being fought. Peacebuilding has become the object of criticism, mistrust, and an ever-evolving debate over its effectiveness.

However, the rise of new powers in global governance is prompting a deviation away from decades-old norms on peacebuilding and intervention. China’s unprecedented economic and political rise in the global community has significantly reshaped global governance and the international political order since the early 2000s. Beijing’s pursuit of great power status, beginning in the “opening and reform” period in the late 1970s and continuing into the Xi-era, has propelled it into a global leadership role that demands greater participation in the resolution of global challenges and a retrospective reconsideration of decades-long policies dictating China’s foreign policy. China’s deepening commitment to global development at the onset of the 21st century, is underpinned by the twin principles of respect for national sovereignty and mutual commitment to non-interference. Yet, as it has expanded its global diplomacy, China has increasingly engaged in fragile, conflict-affected states.

China’s increasingly active role in war-torn countries has deviated from the decades-old liberal view of peacebuilding. Instead, China’s approach is increasingly defined in the terms of its own experience. The “China model,” a popular moniker for China’s development approach is being imported globally through regional and international mechanisms (e.g. the Belt and Road Initiative). However, this approach is not clearly defined when it is applied to countries engaged in violent conflict. While China’s policy of mutual respect of national sovereignty and non-interference remains central to its narrative, it does little to explain the substance of China’s actual engagements in pursuit of peace in conflict or why China has increasingly exerted its diplomatic and political position to lobby both contested governments and UN bodies toward its policy position. As a newly-minted great power wielding considerable influence at the regional and international level, China’s approach to peacebuilding and engaging in conflict-affected regions could play a salient role in redefining traditional norms, means, and mechanisms of peacebuilding. Furthermore, it, for some, provides an alternative to the long-standing liberal approach, which until the present, remains in crisis.

I. Research Question

This research asks two primary questions: “What is China’s approach to engaging in conflict-ridden countries?” and “how has this approach evolved over the previous two decades?”. The answers to these questions are both timely and significant because of the implications of China’s rise for the global governance of peacebuilding and intervention into practiced civil war.

 II. Methodology

To answer these questions, that the framework of this paper series outlines the core characteristics of Chinese engagement in countries engaged in violent conflict. This conceptual framework is constructed through three primary stages. First, the series situates China’s role in conflict-countries within the broader themes of global governance, sovereignty, the international human protection regime, and peacebuilding. Once a framework of peacebuilding as a mechanism of global governance in civil wars is established, this then enables us to identify how China’s approach fits within the broader perspectives and experiences in peacebuilding. This can then be addressed through an historic analysis of the development of China’s foreign policy in relation to conflict-ridden countries in the developing world. This is significant because it explicates the evolution and motivations of Beijing’s increased participation in peacebuilding overtime. Second, the series utilizes content analysis and desk research for a case study of China’s approach in response to the Darfur crisis in Sudan from 2003 to 2010. While conflict in Darfur occurred both prior to and after this period, the selected range of years is significant because it outlines the period where China’s involvement in Darfur was strongest. This framework identifies the core characteristics of China’s engagement in peacebuilding, which is broadly defined. Third, through process-tracing, the Sudan case is used as a benchmark to test the framework against a second case study—China’s engagement with Myanmar (2011-2017) to measure for the continuity of core characteristics. This second case enables an analysis of the patterns and trends which occurred over time across varied cases of engagement. The data collection occurred through three primary methods: process-tracing, content analysis, and desk research. Data was retrieved from numerous primary and secondary sources including monographs, research studies, journal articles, policy papers, books, official documents, UN data, and news sources.

The two primary case studies—Sudan, Myanmar—are particularly salient to the aims of this paper series because of the linear nature in terms of time and the availability of qualitative and quantitative data. Both cases provide a linear timeline of continuous engagement with war-torn countries across a continuous period of time. Furthermore, there is a relatively large amount of qualitative and quantitative data accessible regarding China’s engagement in Sudan and Myanmar in research reports, UN documents, and China state documents. While Syria was initially selected as a case-study, the limitations of data available on China’s engagement limit its effectiveness as a primary case at present. However, it will be briefly discussed at the outset of the paper as China’s increasing interest and role (though still premature) in the Syria peace process will be a significant opportunity for future study.

It is additionally important to note that China’s motivations for engaging in conflict settings requires a more distinct study of Chinese domestic political debates that emerged within both the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) and within the Chinese state. Given extraneous challenges beyond the author’s control, this is beyond the scope of the paper series due to limited data available through desk research. This study could further benefit from field research as well as qualitative interviews with government officials in both the PRC, Sudan, and Myanmar.

III. Structure of the Limited Paper Series

The structure of the paper series is as follows. This introductory chapter outlines the logic and development of the conceptual framework. The second chapter provides an overview and discussion of the key terms and concepts on which this framework is situated including global governance, sovereignty, the international human protection regime, and peacebuilding. The third chapter outlines the historic evolution of China’s foreign policy toward intervention, peacebuilding, and civil war. Chapter four evaluates the core characteristics of China’s approach to the Darfur conflict. The fifth chapter analyses China’s engagement in Myanmar to identify continuities and change in China’s approach. The sixth and final sectionconcludes with a discussion over the implications of the framework, China’s role in peacebuilding more broadly, and opportunities for further research

The following sections (released weekly) will include the following:

• The Global Governance of Peacebuilding

• China’s Approach to International Peacebuilding from a Historical Perspective

• China’s Approach to Darfur

• China’s Approach to Myanmar

• Conclusion and Future Directions