China's first post-Assad Syria meeting

In a significant diplomatic development, Syria's newly appointed President Ahmed al-Sharaa held a meeting with China's Ambassador to Damascus, Shi Hongwei, marking the first official engagement between the two nations since the ousting of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024.

Beijing has waited nearly three months before engaging in formal diplomatic engagement with Syria’s new leadership, a stark contrast to its previous alignment with Assad. Through UN platforms, Chinese officials have carefully emphasized the need to respect the Syrian people’s choice in leadership while simultaneously warning against the dangers of extremist forces gaining ground in the country. China has been particularly vocal about preventing Syria from becoming a safe haven for terrorist groups. However, Beijing’s leadership has also been careful not to directly condemn the new government, despite having previously labeled it as a terrorist organization under Assad’s rule.

Beijing is now reassessing its approach and looking for ways to re-engage with Syria. At the heart of this shift is China’s growing concern over the integration of Uyghurs who fought alongside opposition and militant factions in northwestern Syria into the country’s new institutions. Chinese leaders view this as a serious long-term security threat, fearing that Uyghur militants could turn Syria into a staging ground for future operations—whether inside China or against Chinese nationals and interests abroad.

Syria’s reconstruction is another pressing question. Beijing knows Damascus can’t rebuild on its own, and U.S. sanctions remain a major obstacle to any real economic recovery. China’s BRI offers an alternative to Western-led investment, but it comes with trade-offs. If Syria leans too heavily on Chinese economic support, it risks further straining relations with Washington at a time when it’s looking for ways to ease sanctions and re-enter the global economy.

China will not go at it alone in Syria. Instead, Beijing will look to its Arab partners in the Gulf—particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE—and take cues from how they engage with Syria’s new leadership. This fits within China’s broader diplomatic playbook: aligning its moves with regional consensus rather than acting unilaterally. By taking a coalition-based approach, China reduces risk while ensuring its re-engagement doesn’t create unnecessary friction with key Middle Eastern allies. How the Gulf states navigate Syria’s transition will be pivotal in shaping China’s next steps—whether through cautious diplomatic normalization, economic support, or indirect engagement through regional initiatives.

This engagement comes at a moment of deep uncertainty in U.S. foreign policy, further complicating Syria and China’s calculations as they both navigate a highly complex and volatile Middle East. This uncertainty is amplified by shifting U.S. political alignments away toward Russia, which could push regional actors in unpredictable directions. While Syria’s new leadership is focused on rebuilding and stabilizing the country, it faces a difficult balancing act. Damascus must contend with international credibility concerns tied to the presence of armed radical groups while managing a post-conflict economy marked by extreme fragility—one that could unravel due to any number of factors, from refugee returns to renewed violence.

For China, its priorities remain largely the same as they were under Assad: stability, security, and economic opportunities. But the situation has changed. Uyghur militants played a role in Assad’s ousting, and the new government has, at the very least, tacitly accepted them as part of post-Assad Syria. This presents a new challenge for Beijing. While it seeks to maintain its foothold in Syria, it must now engage with a leadership that has embraced forces China has long viewed as a direct security threat.

Why it matters?

If Syria remains stuck in economic isolation—unable to lift its people out of poverty, rebuild, or create a viable pathway for refugees to return safely—the risk of renewed violence will only grow. A broken economy, deepening hardship, and millions of displaced Syrians with no clear future create the perfect conditions for instability, fueling the potential for extremist resurgence and further fragmentation. But with the right engagement, the right incentives, and the right kind of international coordination and stewardship, Syria has a chance to recover from its brutal civil war.

A carefully managed approach—one that balances reconstruction support with accountability, aligns regional and global efforts, and ensures sustainable refugee reintegration—could help stabilize the country and prevent another cycle of conflict. China’s cautious re-engagement, particularly alongside key regional players, will be part of that equation. Whether it helps Syria move forward or further complicates its fragile recovery will depend on how all sides choose to engage.