China’s Response to Overseas Threats to Chinese Citizens in the Middle East
From Libya to Iran
Evacuations are now a core function of China’s global presence and operations. They are embedded in PLA planning, foreign ministry protocols, and public diplomacy. As China’s footprint deepens, so will demand for more agile, capable, and integrated crisis responses. To meet the demand, Beijing will continue to invest in enhancing its mobility, logistics, intelligence, and diplomatic coordination in conflict areas.
On June 23, China announced the completion of one of its largest and most complex overseas evacuations since the Libya crisis in 2011, safely relocating an estimated 3,125 Chinese nationals from Iran amid rising regional tensions. The operation, coordinated by the Chinese government and its embassies, also included the evacuation of over 500 Chinese citizens from Israel, alongside foreign nationals from the United Kingdom, India, and Poland. With logistical support from Iran, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Armenia, Turkey, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Kuwait, Egypt, and Jordan, China executed the mission swiftly and without reported incident. According to the Foreign Ministry, all Chinese citizens who requested evacuation have been relocated, while those choosing to stay have been advised to prioritize their safety. Chinese diplomatic missions in Iran and Israel remain operational to support those still on the ground.
This latest evacuation highlights a deeper structural challenge for Beijing. As China’s global footprint has expanded through the Belt and Road Initiative, much of its engagement across the Middle East has centered on fragile states—drawn by cheaper access to raw materials, energy reserves, and emerging markets. These economic bets have increasingly exposed Chinese nationals and assets to conflict, political volatility, and post-war instability. China’s first and chaotic mass evacuation from Libya in 2011 marked the emergence of a recurring vulnerability that has since played out in Yemen, Sudan, Lebanon, and now the broader Iran-Israel conflict zone. The latest escalation underscores just how exposed Chinese interests have become.
Framing China’s Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
Beijing’s approach to non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) have become increasingly important over the past fifteen years as Beijing’s regional expansion has meant more Chinese citizens staffing Chinese projects. Chinese scholars define China’s approach to NEOs as the Low-Level Political Priority Model, an approach which elevates the safety of overseas citizens at the same strategic importance as more strategic issues like military and political security objectives. In practice, this approach involves the state prioritizing its coordination the evacuation of Chinese nationals without imposing any financial costs on them. If you are a Chinese national who wants to leave a hostile environment, Chinese authorities will find a way.
The evacuation of Chinese citizens has evolved from an occasional operation to a more routine and systematic process within China’s diplomatic services. More specifically, Chinese scholars underscore that Chinese authorities are investing more resources for the protection of Chinese citizens in the Middle East after responding to a growing number of NEOs. Zhang Dandan and Sun Degang highlight that Chinese authorities have built a comprehensive consular protection system spanning risk prevention, emergency preparedness, crisis response, and logistical support.
For major overseas security incidents, the State Council establishes an inter-ministerial joint conference, which is typically led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For example, during the 2011 Libya evacuation, the State Council formed an emergency command headquarters, with Vice Premier Zhang Dejiang as commander and State Councilor Dai Bingguo responsible for specific coordination. This headquarters included personnel from multiple ministries such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of National Defense, Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Transport, Ministry of Agriculture, State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, Chinese Customs, and the Civil Aviation Administration. This “big consular protection” model is centered on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and coordinated across multiple agencies. It also features a “five-in-one” emergency response mechanism that links the central government, local authorities, overseas missions, Chinese enterprises, and individual citizens.
Libya
When the Libyan civil war erupted in 2011, China faced the stark reality of what Hu Jintao’s "going out" strategy of outbound Chinese investments would mean in practice. Throughout the 2000s, Chinese state-owned enterprises had aggressively secured contracts in Libya’s oil and infrastructure sectors. These ventures brought tens of thousands of Chinese workers into the country, drawn by the promise of high returns in what was then perceived as a politically stable, resource-rich environment. As a result, approximately 35,000 Chinese workers, primarily employed by state-owned enterprises in oil, construction, and infrastructure projects, were trapped in an active war zone. As conditions rapidly deteriorated, the safety of Chinese nationals became Beijing's responsibility after state control in many parts of the country collapsed to non-state actors.
China's deployment of PLA Navy frigates and military transport aircraft to evacuate these workers marked a watershed moment. For the first time, China used military assets in a distant conflict zone to rescue Chinese nationals working abroad as part of China’s global economic expansion. This operation established several critical precedents. It demonstrated that protecting Chinese workers could justify the deployment of PLA forces to war zones for peacetime operations, effectively redefining the practical limits of non-interference in areas of state collapse. It also created domestic expectations that the Chinese state would protect its overseas workers regardless of geopolitical complications. And finally, it revealed how dependent China's overseas economic strategy had become on the safety and continuity of large concentrations of Chinese workers in unstable regions.
Yemen
Just four years later in 2015, when Saudi-led coalition airstrikes targeting Houthi rebel advances threatened Yemen’s stability, China again found itself with significant numbers of nationals at risk. PLA Navy vessels quickly deployed to the Yemen coast and evacuated 571 Chinese citizens. While smaller in scale than Libya, the Yemen operation was significant for two reasons: it included the evacuation of foreign nationals from 15 other countries, and it helped reinforce China’s image as a “responsible major power” willing to provide public goods during crises.
The Yemen case also underscored China's growing exposure to Middle East instability. Prior to the conflict, Chinese construction and infrastructure companies had operated in Yemen for years without major incident. In 2008, Xi Jinping visited Yemen and praised the favorable conditions for scaling bilateral investment and cooperation. Yet in 2015, those same commercial assets became immediate security liabilities.
The evacuation highlighted the operational constraints China faces in unstable environments. The rapid deterioration of security conditions left no time for any planned or gradual withdrawal. Yemen’s airspace was closed, airports were damaged, and Chinese aircraft were unable to land or take off. Chinese nationals—scattered across the country—had to reach Sana'a and Aden by ground travel, were transported by bus to Hodeidah and Aden ports, and then evacuated by sea aboard the PLAN’s Linyi, Weifang, and Weishanhu vessels to Djibouti in batches. In their account of the evacuation, scholars underscored this was the first time that China has used warships as the main means of transportation to evacuate Chinese expatriates from the Middle East. The operation not only marked a shift in China's non-combatant evacuation strategy but also demonstrated its growing willingness to deploy military assets in support of overseas civilian protection under complex security conditions.
In the five years that followed, Beijing shifted from emergency response to strategic risk mitigation. It vastly expanded its Middle East footprint by investing billions into more stable parts of the region—particularly Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the broader GCC. At the same time, Chinese officials increased efforts to reduce the risks to these investments by encouraging regional rivals, notably Iran and Saudi Arabia, to de-escalate tensions. The logic was clear: a more stable Gulf reduced the likelihood of conflict that could threaten Chinese personnel and infrastructure.
The convergence of interests between GCC countries, who also sought to reduce the risk of a Gulf military conflict, Iran, and China drove progress toward a Saudi-Iranian rapprochement, and for several years helped sustain dialogue and diplomatic means for depressurizing the region. These channels remained critical for navigating the Gaza war, Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, Israeli strikes on the Houthis, and Iran’s removal from Syria following the collapse of the Assad government.
Sudan
When war erupted in Sudan in 2023, China faced a more complex evacuation challenge than in previous crises in Libya or Yemen. Chinese nationals in Sudan were widely dispersed due to the breadth of Chinese enterprise operations across multiple sectors and regions. China’s presence in Sudan was also deeper and more historically rooted, with long-standing infrastructure, energy, and development investments. This made coordinated evacuations significantly more difficult.
Reaching extraction points required long and dangerous overland travel. Some Chinese nationals journeyed over 1,000 kilometers through the desert to reach the Egyptian border, while others traveled up to 850 kilometers to Port Sudan on the Red Sea. In response, the PLA Navy diverted two vessels—the guided-missile destroyer Nanning and the supply ship Weishanhu—from anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden. These ships evacuated Chinese and foreign nationals from Port Sudan and transported them to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
The presence of PLA forces in the region—including the Djibouti logistics base—proved critical. Chinese naval personnel provided coordination and security support at key maritime departure points. However, the geographic scale of the crisis limited their reach. Many Chinese citizens in remote areas were left to self-organize transportation to reach coastal extraction zones. Unlike other major powers, China did not deploy helicopters or military aircraft at scale to reach individuals stranded inland.
In total, Beijing evacuated 1,171 people, including 940 Chinese nationals and 231 foreign nationals from ten countries. Analysts noted that China’s approach in Sudan reflected a maturing doctrine for non-combatant evacuation operations. Beijing relied on private security contractors, commercial vehicles, and negotiated safe passage with all conflict parties. Open communication and local coordination helped avoid direct confrontation and ensure smoother extractions.
The operation also reinforced the strategic value of China's military presence in the region. The Djibouti base enabled rapid naval deployment, overcoming the logistical delays seen in the 2011 Libya operation when China lacked a nearby support platform. Sudan demonstrated that China is shifting from reactive crisis response to a more institutionalized model for protecting its citizens and assets overseas—grounded in forward military positioning, flexible logistics, and multi-stakeholder coordination.
From Single Event to Persistent Risk
The 2023 evacuation from Sudan exposed the logistical complexity of extracting Chinese nationals from conflict zones with widespread SOE activity. But by late 2024, the nature of the threat to China’s overseas citizens had evolved—from isolated crises to a persistent, region-wide security environment driven by overlapping flashpoints across Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and the Gulf. Since the start of the Gaza war in 2023, China has been forced to adapt to a Middle East marked by simultaneous and protracted conflict. Escalations between Israel and Iran, Israel and Hezbollah, and flare-ups across Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria created layered, transnational threats to Chinese nationals. These overlapping crises have tested Beijing’s capacity to track, coordinate, and protect its global civilian footprint in volatile and fast-moving conditions.
On October 5, 2024, the Chinese government evacuated over 200 nationals following a sharp escalation in conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon. This marked a significant shift in Beijing’s approach. Unlike in Libya in 2011, where China acted only after state collapse, the Lebanon evacuation was preemptive—authorities intervened before full-scale war made evacuation impossible. Two months later, China faced another challenge in Syria. As the Assad government collapsed in December 2024, Chinese authorities issued urgent advisories calling on nationals to leave while Damascus International Airport remained open. Many fled by land into Lebanon. Notably, Beijing did not organize a formal evacuation; instead, the Chinese embassy remained operational even after the fall of Damascus, continuing to provide consular assistance to those who had not yet evacuated.
The next major escalation occurred in June 2025, as tensions between Israel and Iran exploded into open confrontation. On June 13, Israel launched one of the most sweeping military operations the region has seen in decades, striking dozens of targets across Iran—including nuclear facilities, IRGC bases, and key personnel. The result was an intense exchange of missile strikes and covert operations that plunged both countries into crisis and threatened to drag the wider region into war. This demanded real time decision making from Chinese authorities. They responded quickly. With Israeli airspace closed, Chinese diplomats arranged overland evacuation via the Taba border crossing, moving hundreds of nationals into Egypt. In Iran, China evacuated over 1,600 citizens through land routes into Turkey, Armenia, and Iraq, while warning of border congestion. Over all, Chinese authorities helped evacuate over 3,000 nationals from the region. For now, the war has calmed following a fragile ceasefire, avoiding a worse crisis which could have forced a broader evacuation Chinese nationals from the Gulf countries, like the UAE where an estimated 400,000 Chinese expats reside.
These overlapping operations reflect an important evolution in Beijing’s crisis response. Compared to Libya, Yemen, or Sudan, China must now navigate transnational conflicts and multi-theater emergencies occurring simultaneously. This requires more dynamic embassy coordination, deeper local-level contextual knowledge, and contingency planning that factors in simultaneous threats across multiple states.
Learning from the Evacuations
China’s approach to overseas crisis response has evolved from improvisation to institutionalization, driven by repeated evacuations and rising exposure to fragile environments. Yet the core challenge remains: how to protect Chinese nationals in unstable regions without becoming entangled in those conflicts. This reflects the tension between China’s expanding global presence and the risks it entails.
The 2011 Libya evacuation was the turning point. It brought non-combatant evacuation operations to the forefront of China’s military planning and marked the first large-scale deployment of military assets to evacuate civilians from a distant warzone. It established the precedent that the Chinese state—and increasingly the PLA—would take responsibility for overseas citizen protection. But the operation was reactive, with little forward infrastructure, minimal coordination, and weak intelligence. It exposed critical gaps in China’s ability to project power and manage large-scale overseas operations. These shortcomings spurred reforms. Libya became a case study in what China needed to build to protect overseas interests, assets, and personnel: a blue-water navy, better overseas logistics, and greater airlift capability. The PLA Navy expanded with more versatile platforms, including amphibious assault ships and aircraft carriers. The Y-20 transport aircraft significantly improved the PLA Air Force’s responsiveness and reach.
By 2015, the Yemen evacuation was faster and more assertive. Naval assets were deployed earlier, and China evacuated both its own and foreign nationals, projecting itself as a more capable and responsible military force. Yet limitations remained: airspace closures and damaged infrastructure forced reliance on sea routes, and evacuees endured long overland journeys to reach ports. Still, it showed China’s growing confidence and willingness to act, albeit within a narrowly defined scope.
The Sudan evacuation in 2023 posed a more complex challenge. Chinese nationals were dispersed across the country due to widespread commercial activity. The evacuation required decentralized coordination, overland travel, and use of civilian contractors. China’s naval base in Djibouti proved valuable, allowing quicker deployment of assets. Yet the absence of a Chinese forward-deployed airlift capacity and difficulties reaching citizens in remote areas highlights continuing limitations.
By late 2024, a more anticipatory posture emerged with overlapping conflicts in Syria, Lebanon, Gaza, Israel, and Iran. The Lebanon evacuation, launched in anticipation of a full collapse of security conditions, marked a shift toward earlier action and improved threat assessment. In contrast, the Syria case weeks later highlighted the limits of that posture. Beijing has little advance notice of developments in Syria. As Damascus fell, China opted against a formal evacuation, instead issuing advisories and maintaining a diplomatic presence.
The 2025 Iran-Israel conflict sharpened these lessons. China conducted dual evacuations under the conditions of active military operations and closed airspace, requiring tight coordination with neighboring states. Embassy staff moved swiftly, messaging was consistent, and the effort remained diplomatically low-profile. It was China’s most geographically and diplomatically complex evacuation yet and reflected the maturity of its evolving crisis response capacity.
Across these cases, three trends stand out. First, China’s response speed has improved—from delayed action in Libya to anticipatory efforts in Lebanon and synchronized extractions in Iran and Israel. Second, its methods have diversified. Naval assets remain central, but land convoys, diplomatic coordination, and commercial partnerships are now key tools. Third, diplomatic-military integration has deepened. The PLA has become a formal instrument of overseas citizen protection.
Still, constraints persist. China lacks global airlift and forward-deployment capabilities comparable to other major powers. Its nationals are often in isolated areas, complicating intelligence gathering and extraction. Border closures and infrastructure collapse further hinder evacuation efforts. Despite better planning, these factors limit China’s ability to respond quickly in dispersed or deteriorating settings—especially as it faces the prospect of multiple simultaneous crises.
What has changed is the political and strategic weight of these operations. Evacuations are now a core function of China’s global presence and operations. They are embedded in PLA planning, foreign ministry protocols, and public diplomacy. As China’s footprint deepens, so will demand for more agile, capable, and integrated crisis responses. To meet the demand, Beijing will continue to invest in enhancing its mobility, logistics, intelligence, and diplomatic coordination in conflict areas.