China's Troubled Past with a "Syria-led, Syrian-owned" Future
China has long maintained rhetorical support for a Syrian-led, Syrian-owned political process, but its persistant backing of Assad raises critical questions for the next stage of Syria’s future: What about after Assad is gone? This paper goes back to the early part of the war to look at China’s multilateral approach and the early protection of Assad.
Nearly five months after the first Arab Spring protests erupted in Syria, China, alongside Russia, set a strong tone to the international community and vetoed UNSC Resolution 612, which condemned the Syrian government’s use of force on civilians. In his statement to the UN Security Council, China’s UN Representative Li Baodong outlined China’s position toward the emerging instability in Syria. More broadly, China called for all groups (state and non-state) to exercise restraint, avoid further bloodshed, and de-escalate violence. This would be accomplished through two avenues. First, he noted Beijing’s “hope” that President Bashar al-Assad’s regime would “implement commitments to reform.” Second, Baodong noted expectations for an inclusive, Syrian-led political process in order to facilitate conflict resolution and de-escalation before conditions worsened. In addition, China’s skepticism of Western interventionism partially explains China’s veto. Beijing eschewed Western efforts to exert pressure on the Syrian regime with the possibility of sanctions and instead argued to the UNSC that any UN Security Council action should be oriented toward specific objectives. First, any UN action should facilitate the easing of tension in Syria. Second, it must help to defuse differences through political dialogue and contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability in the Middle East. Third, any UN action must comply with the UN charter and non-interference in Syria’s domestic affairs, emphasizing the significance of this final point for the security and survival of developing countries.
China’s positioning in rejecting Resolution 612 would be the first of many UN resolutions on Syria it would veto alongside Russia, heightening tensions within the UN Security Council over the question of state sovereignty and non-interference in regards to the Syrian government and the future of Assad. From the onset of Syria as a UNSC agenda item in 2011, Beijing positioned itself carefully, balancing its preference for state-led solutions with a more pragmatic realization that it could only achieve this outcome through a gradual, multilateral process. In regards to the former, Beijing used selective vetoes to reinforce its preferences for solutions aligned with the preservation of the Syrian regime and the gradual restoration of its authority through either a negotiated political process or military force (packaged as counterterrorism operations). On the latter, Beijing’s pragmatic approach was reflected in the use of abstentions and approvals for UNSC-approved multilateral mechanisms including various ceasefire regimes, a UN Syria Observer mission, framework for the elimination of chemical weapons, calls for humanitarian access and assistance, and most importantly, the authorization of cross-border humanitarian access.
China’s Multilateral Approach toward a Political Solution in Syria
In 2012, China broadened its position on the peace process and pushed a more regional solution to the Syrian crisis. Earlier that year, Beijing expressed support for the Arab League to play a greater role in facilitating early talks in Syria and providing regional stability. Furthermore, Beijing backed the terms of Kofi Annan’s six-point plan and expressed explicit support for a UN-led multilateral effort to solve the Syrian crisis.
In April 2012, China cosponsored Resolution 2043, establishing the UN Supervision Mission to the Syrian Arab Republic (UNSMIS), to which it also contributed military personnel. However, the Mission’s activities immediately faced significant challenges due to ongoing hostilities across the country. Ahead of the vote to renew its mandate in July 2012, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon reported that the Syrian government refused to engage in political dialogue or continue implementing Annan’s six-point plan until the opposition surrendered. Further complicating matters, the regime maintained an absolutist position, convinced it could "succeed militarily against opposition" in key cities like Aleppo, and continued using heavy weapons in combat.
On the day of the renewal vote in July 2012, China vetoed draft Resolution 538 (cosponsored by the United States and its European allies) because of a Chapter VII mandate inclusion outlining economic sanctions for Syria’s non-compliance. During the debate over the draft, Li Baodong criticized the sponsors for using intervention to “fuel the flames” and “sow discord” in “complete disregard of the possible consequences” in Syria. Western states, meanwhile, criticized China and Russia for pursuing their own interests by backing Assad rather than prioritizing the protection of civilian lives.
The debate over the mission’s renewal revolved around the question of regime compliance and fears over the use of force to unseat Assad, further fueled by deep skepticism between both parties. Russia and China remained wary of U.S. and Western intentions regarding the Chapter VII mandate, citing NATO’s previous use of UN authorization to overthrow Ghaddafi in Libya despite Russian and Chinese protests. Conversely, the United States and its allies argued that Russia and China prioritized national interests over their responsibility to protect Syrian civilians. U.S. Representative Susan Rice expressed deep skepticism of Syria’s pledge to comply with the mission, referencing reports of non-compliance, including continued use of heavy weapons in city centers, torture, violence against civilians, and efforts to terrorize Syrian communities. Similarly, UK Ambassador to the UN Mark Grant criticized China’s skepticism of Western intervention as “irrational,” emphasizing that sanctions could not be misconstrued as “military intervention.”
On the question of rising violence in Syria, China, while praising UNSMIS’ work, did not address reports of the Syrian government’s non-compliance from both UN member states and the UN Secretary-General. The Syrian government’s escalation and failure to engage under the terms of the peace process went largely unaddressed by China, which argued instead that UNSC consensus on a pathway forward in Syria was a greater priority than coercing the regime to comply. Ultimately, China’s multilateral approach suffered because of the regime’s unwillingness to comply with various agreements, both through UNSMIS and other diplomatic channels, including further Arab League mediation efforts.
As Ban Ki-Moon noted, the Syrian regime was convinced it could win against the opposition through sheer military force and violence. Meanwhile, China and Russia’s resistance to UNSC action toward Syria or even an orientation toward collective action limited any consensus on enforcing compliance with international law and Annan’s six-point plan. The heightened tensions over UNSMIS’ failure to de-escalate violence and end the government’s use of heavy weapons against civilian populations resulted in its expiration in August 2012. This four-month multilateral experiment failed to produce the desired result and exacerbated an already bifurcated political divide within the UN Security Council.
The 2014 passage of UNSC Resolution 2165 by the United Nations Security Council represented a pivotal moment in the international response to the Syrian conflict. It marked the first time that the Security Council authorized cross-border humanitarian aid without the consent of the Syrian government, effectively bypassing Syrian sovereignty. This extraordinary measure was driven by mounting international pressure in the face of the Assad regime's brutal siege tactics and unrelenting attacks on opposition-held areas, which had created an unprecedented humanitarian crisis.
This resolution followed UNSC Resolution 2139, which had demanded the lifting of all sieges in Syria and unhindered humanitarian access. When these demands were met with resistance from Assad, the Council escalated its actions with Resolution 2165 in July 2014. This decision reflected the global community's frustration with the regime's obstruction of aid and its broader intransigence in the face of international demands for relief and accountability.
However, the political process in Syria stagnated despite these humanitarian measures. By 2015, Russia had assumed a dominant role in the Syrian war, sidelining the United States and European powers as the guarantor of a Syrian-led political process. This shift saw the transition of peace talks from Geneva to Astana, Kazakhstan in 2017, where Russia, alongside Iran and Turkey, positioned itself as the principal architect of Syria’s post-conflict future.
The Astana process departed significantly from earlier international efforts that had sought to integrate diverse Syrian voices and pursue a genuine political solution. Instead, it became a forum focused on consolidating Assad's position while reconciling fragmented elements of the opposition to his regime. This shift reinforced a peace framework that prioritized stabilizing Assad’s rule over addressing the deeper grievances and aspirations of the Syrian people, perpetuating a fragile and deeply contested status quo.
To Astana and Beyond
With the launch of the Astana peace
process, China stepped back from an active role in shaping Syria's political trajectory, allowing Russia to assume the mantle as the primary international backer of the Assad government. Russia’s military and diplomatic support solidified Assad’s position and shifted the peace process toward a framework favoring regime consolidation rather than inclusive political reform.
China, while less prominent in the political and military dimensions of the conflict, maintained a consistent focus on its long-term strategic and economic interests. Over time, Beijing began expanding its economic ties with the Assad government, seeing Syria as a potential avenue for future Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects and post-conflict reconstruction. This gradual economic engagement signaled China's pragmatic approach to navigating the complexities of the Syrian crisis.
In parallel, China advocated for the gradual restoration of Assad’s control over Syria’s borders, including by ending UNSC authorization for the crossborder humanitarian mechanism, first in Jordan and Iraq, then with Turkiye following the 2023 earthquake. Through its influence in international forums, including the United Nations, China worked to facilitate the normalization and legitimization of the Assad government both within the Arab world, helping secure Syria’s return to the Arab league, and the broader international community.
Although China's role was less visible than Russia's, its support for Assad’s normalization highlighted a shared interest in reinforcing Assad’s control as the means to stability rather than a Syrian-led, Syrian owned peace process. For Beijing, this proverbial train had already left the station.
Commitment to a Syrian-Led, Syrian-Owned Peace Process?
China is returning to the language of “Syrian-led, Syrian-owned” after Assad’s departure. China’s calls for such a peace process, as early as 2011, were multilateral in nature and reflected Beijing’s desire to create alignment in the UN and regional actors, particularly the Arab League, in favor of the Syrian regime. They did not want a replay of Libya or Egypt. However, many grew understandably skeptical of China’s understanding of “Syrian-led and owned” after Beijing vetoed resolutions originating both from the western bloc and the Arab league. Furthermore, there were questions over whether China’s insistence on a Syrian-led process, if genuine, could realistically compel the Assad regime to engage in meaningful dialogue with the opposition. As time will tell, it did not. Instead, Assad’s regime defied pressure from UNSC and resorted to the use of force and atrocities to regain control, rather than pursuing reconciliation.
This dynamic placed China in a difficult position. While it called for a Syrian-led process in name, the regime’s defiance and reliance on military solutions rendered such aspirations hollow in practice. Beijing’s strategic alignment with Assad meant it could not pursue alternative outcomes without jeopardizing its broader interests in Syria. When Russia committed military forces to the conflict in 2015, China’s role as an Assad backer became firmly entrenched in the international community’s perception. Over the next decade, China’s voting patterns at the UN consistently reflected its alignment with Assad and its prioritization of state sovereignty over international intervention.
Although China continued to advocate for a political solution in Syria, its multilateral efforts were increasingly overshadowed by its close association with the Assad regime. This alignment not only limited Beijing’s ability to influence the conflict but also raised questions about the credibility of its commitment to an inclusive, Syrian-owned process. As the war progressed, the international community viewed China less as a neutral arbiter and more as a guarantor of Assad’s grip on power.
Assad is now gone. China is coming back to the table on Syria. There seems to be alignment within the UN Security Council, including the U.S. and China, on a) the desire for stability, b) that Syria should not be staging ground for terrorism, and c) a Syrian-led and owned process. This could be the chance for collective action to empower the Syrian people and work collectively to mediate and mitigate local and international players who could push Syria back into conflict.