Israel & Iran strike, Washington moves, Beijing hesitates
The Israel-Iran conflict appears to be entering a prolonged and dangerous phase. What began as a targeted military exchange now risks spiraling into a broader regional war that could draw in Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. Reports suggest that the United States and several European countries may participate in upcoming operations—creating a more complex and combustible environment that threatens to engulf the entire region.
Most Middle Eastern states are not eager to see such a confrontation unfold. Several GCC countries—which just five years ago might have supported military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities—have sharply criticized Israel’s preemptive strikes and escalating posture. No country wants to be dragged in the middle of an Israel-Iranian conflict. If current reports are accurate, some Arab states have also limited U.S. military activity from their territory, including use of offensive weapons platforms that might support Israeli operations. This marks a notable shift for many Middle East states, who just a few years ago were seeking integrated air and missile defense capacities to deter Iranian missile and drone threars across the region. It reflects a broader desire among regional states to assert greater agency and strategic autonomy in the face of escalating tensions between Israel, Iran, and external powers and, to the extent possible, remain out of the fray of the escalation.
The market consequences of a sustained Israel-Iran conflict would be severe—on par with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. A prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz would disrupt global energy supplies, send oil prices soaring, and introduce elevated risk across the Middle East. Key energy exporters like Saudi Arabia and the broader GCC would face immediate economic fallout: disrupted supply chains, foreign investor hesitancy, and heightened volatility across financial markets. The shock would be felt far beyond the region.
Behind the scenes, debate continues over whether Israel coordinated its attacks with the U.S. or acted unilaterally to sabotage Trump’s quiet efforts to restart nuclear negotiations with Iran. Israeli leadership may have seen a strategic opportunity to derail diplomacy just as the IAEA censured Tehran and backchannel talks were reportedly underway in Oman.
The next few days will determine if the conflict widens or if Trump and Iran can rejumpstart talks. The U.S. Secretary of Defense said Monday that Trump still wants a deal with Iran, but the escalation in strikes and uncertainty over the Trump administration and Israel’s next steps casts a long shadow of uncertainty on the region.
The US prepares for next steps
The U.S. has quietly begun repositioning military assets to the Middle East in response to the Israel–Iran escalation, but deliberately withheld details on the nature of these deployments. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth announced that “additional defensive capabilities” had been sent to the region—without specifying exactly what those entailed.
According to flight-tracking data, over two dozen Air Force refuelling tankers have been shifted from the U.S. to Europe and are poised to support any operations in the Middle East. Meanwhile, the USS Nimitz carrier strike group—rerouted from the South China Sea—will soon reinforce the USS Carl Vinson in the Arabian Sea, and several destroyers and missile-defense systems (Patriot/THAAD batteries and naval interceptors) are reportedly being positioned closer to Israel.
China’s Tough Decision
China has stepped into the fray, adopting a cautious but increasingly active diplomatic posture. Beijing has expressed “deep concern” over Israel’s military actions and has called on both sides to exercise restraint. Chinese embassies in Israel and Iran issued urgent security alerts, warning citizens of the risks of missile and drone attacks and advising evacuation—especially overland via Jordan due to restricted airspace. Foreign Minister Wang Yi held calls with both Israeli and Iranian counterparts, signaling China’s readiness to play a “constructive role” in de-escalation. At the United Nations, China’s ambassador formally condemned the Israeli strikes and demanded an immediate halt to further military operations.
Yet beneath this public diplomacy lies a far more complex and difficult balancing act. In the lead-up to the conflict, China’s sympathy for Iran had already begun to cool after months of inconsistent and confounding behavior from Tehran. Since the end of 2024, Iran’s actions have appeared erratic—one moment drawing close to Beijing with strategic cooperation and promises of alignment, and the next pivoting toward the West with renewed calls for nuclear negotiations, while simultaneously denying involvement in high-profile assassination plots. “This erratic back-and-forth leaves observers stunned,” wrote one Chinese netizen.
Recent commentary circulating in Chinese media and social platforms reflects an increasingly indifferent and skeptical view of Tehran. Some analysts and netizens have emphasized that the China-Iran relationship is transactional at best and lacks the emotional or strategic depth of Beijing’s ties with countries like Russia or Pakistan. “Iran is almost invisible on the emotional map of ordinary Chinese people,” wrote one commentator. “Unlike Russia, which carries the heroic image of a fighting nation, or Pakistan, which enjoys the status of ‘iron brothers’, Iran commands little presence among our people—let alone any real goodwill.”
Others were more blunt: “In the minds of the Chinese, Iran is neither an enemy nor a friend, let alone a role model. It is just a Middle Eastern country sanctioned by the United States—nothing more.”
Beijing’s frustration appears to stem, in part, from what it perceives as Iran’s attempt to hedge between major powers while offering little in return. As one Chinese observer wrote: “Iran, unable to find a way out, finally thought of China after being repeatedly humiliated by the United States and Israel.” They added: “There is a foundation for cooperation—Iran has energy, China has technology and markets—but don’t think we [China] are going to tie ourselves to the Iranian ship.”
Indeed, high-level contacts between Tehran and Beijing have noticeably stalled in recent weeks. Iran’s absence from major diplomatic gatherings—including the May 9 Victory Day parade in Moscow—further highlighted its deepening isolation after seemingly prioritizing rapprochement with Washington over ties with China and Russia.
Beijing’s immediate concern is the security of the Strait of Hormuz, a vital artery for Chinese energy imports. But a deeper fear looms: that Israel’s decapitation strategy—targeting top Iranian leaders and nuclear scientists—could create a power vacuum in Tehran and potentially trigger regime collapse. For China, that outcome would be deeply destabilizing, disrupting regional energy security and undermining its broader vision for multipolar stability. Though Beijing is unlikely to intervene militarily, it may seek to use quiet diplomacy and backchannels to preserve some degree of regional equilibrium—and to avoid being dragged into the fallout of another failed state in the Middle East.