This Middle East trip feels different, but familiar. This is my third week in the region, and I will be traveling much more extensively the next three months.
A few key observations:
1) It no longer feels like the era of American hegemony in the region anymore. New actors are present. Things have changed the past few years, and you can see and feel that distinction in discussions with local communities. This has been more acute beyond the Gulf in places like Jordan and Egypt. The Gaza war changed quite a bit of the calculus in the Levant, and Arab streets are frustrated.
2) The GCC clearly has huge ambitions, and those ambitions are translating into massive investments, growing industries, and deliberate efforts to localize expertise. With that comes a greater demand for Gulf states to play a larger role in mediating conflicts in the broader region. What is new is how they manage when those conflicts reach their own doorstep. For me, a GCC shift toward collective mediation could be a strong move to begin to have more cohesive, coordinated approaches to conflicts both in and beyond their borders.
3) Israel’s strike on Doha unsettled Qatar and exposed the fragility of U.S. security commitments. Even with normalization under the Abraham Accords, Israel does not see all GCC states as equal and engages selectively. For the GCC, this moment underscores the risks of remaining divided. While Israel may not perceive the GCC as a collective actor, the Gulf states may increasingly need to see themselves that way—finding ways to restrain internal rivalries and focus on building a unified diplomatic, political, and security framework. This connects with the third point, and the GCC response was one of the first major tests for how GCC coordination could be structured moving forward.
4) For Washington, Israel’s actions in Doha mark a unique moment of decision. The U.S.–Israel security relationship remains deep, but divergences are widening—not just on regional priorities but on Israel’s readiness to act beyond Washington’s reach. Reports that Israel circumvented U.S. and GCC radar systems to strike Qatar, along with delayed notifications, highlight the problem. It undercuts the credibility of U.S.-backed integrated defense systems and raises questions for Gulf partners about how much faith to place in that architecture.
5) Jordan, meanwhile, is caught in the turbulence. Assad’s overthrow created one set of challenges, but Suwayda’s collapse has produced another. Amman is also deeply uneasy about Israel’s trajectory. Moves toward annexation in the West Bank or the permanent displacement of Gazans would carry destabilizing consequences for Jordan’s domestic politics and security. At the same time, Jordan is trying to play a more direct role in shaping outcomes across its northern border, as shown in the Suwayda roadmap. Yet its position remains precarious, squeezed by crises on multiple fronts. Jordan’s real challenges remain its internal resource scarcity, growing unemployment, and few options to find resolutions for either. The promise of interconnectivity they hoped the IMEC corridor would bring are linked to cooperation with Israel, which is increasingly growing fraught. Amman, facing the prospect of reduced US funding, will be more reliant on the GCC and, maybe, China if it can do so on more equitable terms.
All of this unfolds against the backdrop of a region recalibrating to multipolarity. Gulf capitals are increasingly acting as pivots between Washington, Beijing, and other rising players. Iran remains a constant factor in their security calculus, but the Doha strike showed that this Israeli government can be just as destabilizing a variable.
More thoughts to come!
Where will you be visiting? Curious what you hear on Yemen if you visit any Gulf countries.