The Legacy of Libya in Chinese Foreign Policy

The Arab Spring majorly shaped China’s foreign policy to the Middle East, especially that of Xi Jinping, and fourteen years later is still teaching lessons on what it means to be a great power in the Middle East [see my previous paper “Smelling Jasmine in the Arab Spring” looking at the impact of the Arab Spring on China. This paper has evolved over a few years, but aims to capture some of that nuance by looking at how Libya shaped China’s regional interests, military modernization, and future of its operations in the Middle East.

China-Libya Relations Before 2011

Before the 2011 intervention, China and Libya maintained a stable and mutually beneficial relationship, primarily driven by economic interests. The foundation of their relationship dates back to the 1970s when China began to engage with countries across Africa and the Middle East as part of its broader strategy to build alliances with the Global South during the Cold War. Libya, under Muammar Gaddafi’s leadership, shared China’s skepticism toward Western dominance in global affairs, creating a natural alignment between the two nations.

Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, China significantly expanded its diplomatic and economic ties with Libya, particularly in the context of Hu Jintao’s “Go Out” policy, which encouraged Chinese companies to pursue investments abroad. China was keen on securing access to Libya’s vast oil reserves, which were among the largest in Africa. In exchange, Libya welcomed Chinese investment in infrastructure, energy, and construction projects. By the mid-2000s, Chinese companies had established a substantial presence in Libya, working on various large-scale infrastructure and energy projects, including roads, housing, and telecommunications.

Economic Overview of China-Libya Relations

By 2011, Libya had become an important economic partner for China in North Africa. Two years prior, China’s Ministry of Commerce estimated Chinese capital investment in Libya amounted to $426 billion. The bilateral trade between the two countries had grown steadily, with China importing significant quantities of Libyan oil. China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and other Chinese state-owned enterprises were deeply involved in Libya’s oil sector, with several major contracts for exploration and development.

Chinese companies were also heavily invested in Libya’s infrastructure development. At the time of the 2011 intervention, China had approximately 75 companies operating in Libya, involved in over 50 large-scale projects, including housing developments, railways, and telecommunications infrastructure. These projects were valued in the billions of dollars, making Libya a key destination for Chinese overseas investment.

Libya’s geographic location also held strategic importance for China, serving as a potential gateway to North Africa and the Mediterranean. The country’s relatively stable political environment under Gaddafi’s rule, combined with its wealth of natural resources, made it an attractive partner for China as it sought to diversify its energy supplies and expand its economic footprint in the region.

China's Interests in Libya

China’s interests in Libya prior to the 2011 crisis were primarily economic, focused on securing access to energy resources and participating in lucrative infrastructure projects. The stability of Libya under Gaddafi’s regime was crucial to protecting these interests, as it allowed for predictable economic relations and a secure environment for Chinese nationals and businesses.

Libya’s oil was of particular significance to China, which was then the world’s second-largest consumer of oil. As China’s economy grew rapidly, its demand for energy soared, leading to increased reliance on foreign oil. Libya’s high-quality crude oil was an important part of China’s strategy to diversify its energy sources, reducing dependence on more volatile regions like the Middle East.

Beyond energy, China was also interested in Libya as a market for its construction and telecommunications sectors. The projects undertaken by Chinese companies in Libya were part of China’s broader strategy of exporting its development model to the Global South. These projects not only generated significant revenue for Chinese firms but also helped to strengthen China’s influence in Africa and the Arab world.

However, China’s interests in Libya were not without risks. The concentration of Chinese nationals and assets in a single country exposed China to significant vulnerabilities in the event of political instability. The 2011 crisis highlighted these risks, as the outbreak of civil war quickly threatened the safety of Chinese citizens and the viability of Chinese investments. This situation highlighted for China the need to enhance its capabilities to protect its interests overseas, a realization that would drive major changes in China’s foreign policy and military strategy in the years that followed.

China’s Libya Predicament

On February 17, 2011, widespread protests erupted against the 42-year rule of Muammar Gaddafi, Libya’s long-time authoritarian leader. Inspired by the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, Libyans took to the streets demanding political reform, greater freedoms, and an end to Gaddafi’s regime.

The protests quickly escalated into an armed conflict as Gaddafi’s forces responded with brutal repression. In response, opposition groups formed the National Transitional Council (NTC) and began seizing control of several cities, particularly in the eastern part of the country, including Benghazi, Libya’s second-largest city. The conflict soon devolved into a full-scale civil war, with Gaddafi’s forces battling rebel groups across the country.

As Gaddafi’s forces clashed with rebel groups across Libya, the situation rapidly escalated into a large-scale crisis. In the chaotic weeks following the collapse of order, Chinese companies, their staff, and assets became targets for local armed groups throughout Libya. With little to no support from local authorities, Chinese citizens were left to organize their own protection. Many Chinese companies and their personnel faced violent attacks, were robbed of their possessions, and had to resort to self-defense. In one notable incident, the employees of the China Communications Construction (CCC) in Misrata, nearly 5,000 Libya and Chinese staff, formed vigilante groups and defended themselves against armed assailants by throwing stones in a desperate counterattack, according to a company statement. The company reported calling the local authorities. Upon arrival, the authorities saw a large armed group with guns, and abruptly left. In another case, over 1000 Chinese workers at a work site in Ajdabya were robbed and removed from their housing, made homeless. One worker present described the situation: “The entire Ajdabiya was in chaos, with gun-wielding youths and children blocking foreigners' cars everywhere, and rocks flying overhead, with no security at all.”

In response to growing reports of attacks on Chinese nationals across Libya, Chinese President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao ordered “all out efforts” to protect and evacuate Chinese citizens from the country on February 22. Days before the senior level statement, China’s Department of Consular Affairs subsequently ordered the Chinese Embassy in Libya to prepare to evacuate, and China’s Consular Protection Center reached out to Chinese citizens across Libya through Weibo and QQ platforms, forming what Chinese media called the “lifeline” for those in need of evacuation. Information coming directly from evacuees was funneled through the “official QQ group” of the Libya evacuation operation, to the Chinese Embassy in Libya, and on Chinese leaders at Zhongnanhai. Zhang Dejiang, the vice premier of the State Council who previously oversaw the state response to the 2009 Heilongjiang mine explosion, oversaw the interagency taskforce, also termed the “four-in-one emergency response mechanism” managing the Libya evacuation operations. Scholars argue the decision to put Zhang, also a politburo member, at the helm of the response was critical to ensure compliance from the full interagency, including both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Consular services and all branches of the military activated to support the operations.

The operation that unfolded over the next 12 days was unprecedented for China. The Chinese government mobilized 91 chartered Chinese civil aviation flights, 35 chartered foreign airlines, 12 military aircraft, 11 rented foreign ships, 5 COSCO and COSCO cargo ships, and 1 warship. This massive effort resulted in the successful evacuation of 35,860 Chinese nationals from Libya. Chinese political leaders praised Beijing’s “four-in-one” emergency response mechanism, led by Zhang, noting there were “no obstacles to communication and coordination” across various departments, including the four military branches, central and local governments, overseas embassies and consulates, and Chinese enterprises.

On February 25, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) diverted the Xuzhou, a modern missile frigate, from its anti-piracy patrols off the coast of Somalia and dispatched it to the Libyan coast to support the evacuation effort. This ship, however, did not host evacuees due to limited capacity on board, but instead escorted merchant vessels carrying Chinese citizens. On February 27, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) sent four IL-76 aircraft, which conducted 12 sorties to evacuate Chinese nationals to Khartoum and Beijing. Over the next ten days, chartered merchant vessels, aircraft, and overland transportation facilitated the evacuation of all 35,860 Chinese nationals in Libya.

The deployment of the Xuzhou and the use of long-range military transport aircraft marked China’s first overseas military operation aimed at evacuating its citizens, uniting multiple branches of China’s armed forces with chartered civilian and commercial vessels to execute the mission.

Exposing and Addressing Military Gaps: Libya’s Role in Shaping China’s Military Modernization

The 2011 Libya crisis revealed significant weaknesses in China’s military capacity, particularly in its ability to respond to crises involving its citizens and investments abroad. While the evacuation of over 35,000 Chinese nationals showcased remarkable logistical coordination, it also highlighted critical gaps in China’s ability to project power and manage large-scale operations overseas. The deployment of the Xuzhou, a PLAN missile frigate, underscored the navy’s limitations. The frigate, while new, was restricted to escort duties and lacked the capacity to transport evacuees or provide substantial logistical support. Similarly, the PLA-AF’s reliance on its limited fleet of IL-76 transport aircraft exposed the constrained airlift capacity, as the aircraft struggled to handle the demands of evacuating thousands of citizens efficiently. These challenges were compounded by China’s heavy dependence on civilian chartered vessels and aircraft, which, while effective during the Libya operation, underscored the absence of dedicated military resources for such missions. The logistical hurdles of operating without forward-deployed assets or regional military bases further hampered China’s response, emphasizing the need for a more robust and self-reliant military presence abroad.

In the aftermath of the crisis, Chinese leadership recognized the urgency of addressing these shortcomings. The Libya experience became a driving force behind a series of military modernization efforts aimed at enhancing China’s capacity to safeguard its growing global interests. The PLAN accelerated its transformation into a blue-water navy, expanding its fleet to include larger and more versatile vessels such as amphibious assault ships and aircraft carriers. These additions provided the navy with the capability to transport troops, deliver supplies, and support complex operations far from Chinese shores. In parallel, the development of the Y-20 transport aircraft marked a significant leap forward for the PLAAF. This new platform offered greater payload capacity and range, addressing the airlift limitations exposed during the Libya evacuation and ensuring more efficient deployment of personnel and equipment in future crises.

Recognizing the strategic value of a forward-deployed military presence, China also established its first overseas military base in Djibouti in 2017. Strategically located near critical shipping lanes and conflict-prone regions, this base provided a logistical hub that significantly enhanced China’s ability to respond rapidly to emergencies and sustain operations in Africa and the Middle East. At the same time, institutional reforms within the PLA improved inter-branch coordination and operational efficiency. The creation of joint command systems and theater commands facilitated better integration of naval, air, and ground forces, ensuring a more cohesive and effective response to complex missions.

The Libya crisis also brought non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOs) to the forefront of China’s military priorities. The experience underscored for Chinese authorities the importance of readiness and contingency planning, which resulted to an increased focus on training programs and the development of operational frameworks for large-scale evacuations. This shift reflected China’s evolving view of its military not only as a tool for national defense but also as a critical instrument for protecting its global interests and citizens. China would again get to measure the developments of this capacity a few years later when the Chinese military would - again - lead a noncombatant evacuation of its citizens and other expatriates from Yemen.

By addressing the gaps exposed during the Libya evacuation, China modernized its military capabilities and redefined its approach to global engagement. The crisis served as a turning point, prompting a pragmatic shift in Chinese foreign policy that balanced its longstanding principle of non-interference with the necessity of safeguarding its expanding global footprint. This evolution not only strengthened China’s ability to respond to future crises but also signaled its growing ambition to play a more active and responsible role on the international stage. Libya’s legacy continues to shape China’s military strategy and its broader foreign policy priorities, reflecting the lessons learned from a pivotal moment in its rise as a global power.

Libya and the Evolution of China's Foreign Policy Learning Curve

The case of Libya exemplified a critical juncture in China’s foreign policy learning curve, highlighting its evolving approach to the principles of sovereignty, non-interference, and multilateral diplomacy. China’s decision to abstain from United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1973, which authorized military intervention in Libya, marked a notable departure from its traditionally rigid stance on non-interference. This shift was primarily influenced by the broad support for the resolution from regional organizations such as the Arab League and the African Union. In weighing its response, China demonstrated an unprecedented consideration for the opinions of African and Arab states, signaling an early attempt to align its actions with the broader regional consensus.

However, China’s abstention came at a significant domestic and international cost. Critics within China accused the government of “compromising its principles” and questioned whether the decision amounted to a betrayal of its long-held commitment to non-interference. This internal backlash reflected the tension between adhering to ideological principles and responding pragmatically to the dynamics of multilateral diplomacy. Moreover, by abstaining, China indirectly facilitated the NATO-led intervention, which not only resulted in the toppling of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime but also exposed thousands of Chinese workers to the dangers of the ensuing civil war. This outcome underscored Beijing’s perceptions of the irresponsibility of Western powers in conflict resolution, as the intervention plunged Libya into prolonged instability and human suffering.

Lessons from Libya: Refining Multilateral Diplomacy

The Libyan experience influenced China’s approach to multilateral diplomacy and conflict resolution. The backlash against UNSCR 1973 served as a cautionary tale for Beijing, emphasizing the importance of balancing regional and domestic interests while safeguarding its principles. As a result, China began adopting a more assertive stance in multilateral fora, particularly in cases where it perceived Western-led interventions as destabilizing.

This shift was evident in China’s response to the Syrian conflict, which erupted shortly after the Libyan intervention. Unlike in Libya, where China had significant economic and material interests at stake, its involvement in Syria was driven primarily by a desire to influence the trajectory of the conflict and prevent a repeat of the Libyan experience. China used its position on the UN Security Council to veto multiple resolutions that it believed could lead to regime change or external military intervention. This approach demonstrated a recalibration of China’s foreign policy, with a stronger emphasis on upholding state sovereignty and advocating for political solutions through dialogue and negotiation.

China also sought to enhance its role as a mediator by engaging in multilateral and bilateral diplomacy to address the Syrian crisis. While its economic stakes in Syria were minimal compared to Libya, China’s activism reflected a growing recognition of the strategic and reputational implications of its actions in the Middle East. By emphasizing non-military solutions and calling for inclusive negotiations, Beijing positioned itself as a counterbalance to what it perceived as Western interventionism.

From Libya to Xi Jinping’s Middle East Strategy

The lessons from Libya extended beyond Syria, shaping the broader contours of Xi Jinping’s Middle East foreign policy. Under Xi’s leadership, China has adopted a more nuanced approach to the principle of non-interference, recognizing that rigid adherence to the doctrine may not always align with its growing global interests. While the principle remains a cornerstone of China’s foreign policy, Beijing has shown greater flexibility in engaging with regional and international stakeholders to navigate complex conflicts and crises.

This pragmatism has allowed China to expand its influence in the Middle East by presenting itself as a reliable and impartial partner. By emphasizing multilateralism, respect for sovereignty, and state-led development, China has strengthened its ties with key regional actors, including Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the Gulf Cooperation Council. The Libyan experience underscored the importance of regional voices in shaping China’s decisions, a lesson that continues to inform its diplomatic engagements across the Arab world.

For further reading:

1. “35,860 Chinese Nationals in Libya Evacuated: FM,” Xinhua, March 3, 2011, http://en.people.cn/90001/90776/90883/7306385.html.

2. Carlotta Gall, “11 Chinese Workers Killed in Rebel Attack in Afghanistan,” New York Times, June 10, 2004, https://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/10/international/asia/11-chinese-workers-killed-in-rebel-attack-in-afghanistan.html.

3. China News Weekly, “Full record of evacuation of Chinese nationals from Libya,” March 10, 2011, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/sd/2011-03-10/145222088651.shtml.

4. “Chinese Military's Role in Overseas Evacuations,” China Military Online, December 12, 2013, http://www.81.cn/lj/2013-12/12/content_5688239_3.htm.

5. Downs, Erica. “China’s ‘New’ Energy Administration.” China Brief, vol. 8, no. 8, 2008, pp. 2-6.

6. “Diyici Dongyong Junshi Liliang Cheqiao: 2011 Nian Libiya Dacheqiao” 第一次动用军事力量撤侨：2011年利比亚大撤侨 [The First Military Evacuation: the 2011 Libyan evacuation]. Xinhua, August 15, 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2017-08/15/c_1121487719.htm.

7. Jonas Parello-Plesner and Mathieu Duchatel, “International Rescue: Beijing’s Mass Evacuation from Libya,” Adelphi Series, vol. 54, no. 451, pp. 107-124. China’s Strong Arm: Protecting Citizens and Assets Abroad, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19445571.2014.1047141.

8. Jeremy Page, “Libyan Turmoil Prompts Chinese Naval Firsts,” Wall Street Journal, February 25, 2011, https://www.wsj.com/articles/BL-CJB-13381.

9. Patey, Luke. “China's Libya Evacuation Highlights its Global Rise.” Foreign Policy, March 1, 2011.

10. Salman Masood, “Bomb Kills 3 and Injures 11 in Pakistan,” New York Times, May 4, 2004, https://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/04/world/bomb-kills-3-and-injures-11-in-pakistan.html.

11. Shaio Zerba, “China’s Libya Evacuation Operation: A New Diplomatic Imperative—Overseas Citizen Protection,” Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 23, no. 90, November 2014, pp. 1093-1112.

12. Shichor, Yitzhak. “Libya and China: Reciprocity, Interests, and Concerns.” Middle East Policy, vol. 18, no. 2, 2011, pp. 124-139. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1475-4967.2011.00488.x.

13. Sun, Degang. “China and the Arab League: Convergence and Cooperation Post-Libyan Crisis.” Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 22, no. 83, 2013, pp. 467-484.

14. “107b yuan worth of projects at risk in Libya,” South China Morning Post, https://www.scmp.com/article/739876/107b-yuan-worth-projects-risk-libya-2-chinese-companies-say.

15. “PLA Navy Sends Warship to Safeguard Libya Evacuees,” South China Morning Post, https://www.scmp.com/article/739196/pla-navy-sends-warship-safeguard-libya-evacuees.

16. “‘Go Global’ Investment Strategy Needed for Chinese Enterprises,” People’s Daily, September 12, 2001, http://www.china.org.cn/english/GS-e/19033.htm.

17. Yun Sun, “Syria: What China Has Learned from Its Libya Experience,” Asia Pacific Bulletin, no. 152, February 27, 2012, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/139823/apb152_1.pdf.

18. Zweig, David, and Bi Jianhai. “China’s Global Hunt for Energy.” Foreign Affairs, vol. 84, no. 5, 2005, pp. 25-38.