The Use of Siege Tactics in Syria: A Case Study (Paper 4)
A primary means of humanitarian exploitation employed by the Syrian government was the act of physically blocking or preventing humanitarian assistance (vital food stuffs, water, medicine, non-food items, and more) from entering certain civilian areas as a tactic of war and means of achieving a specific outcome. While this category can include both bureaucratic and political means, this section will explore the use of military forces or proxy forces to enforce a siege or blockade which reflect a concerted effort to induce dire humanitarian conditions on the populations therein. A siege, in this context, is defined by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) as an area which is “surrounded by armed actors with the sustained effect that humanitarian assistance cannot regularly enter, and civilians, the sick and wounded cannot regularly exit” (IICISAR, 2018: 3). A primary impact of the siege in the Syria case threefold. It prevented the early spread of the opposition in and around Damascus; it served as a conflict-management strategy; and it functioned as collective punishment for opposition communities (including civilians) who rebelled, by inducing starvation and outbreak of disease. According to data accessed by the author from Siege Watch, an initiative of PAX and the Syria Institute monitoring and reporting on siege warfare in the Syrian conflict, the Syrian government employed sieges in 55 cases from 2012 to 2018 (this number excludes sieges carried out by Syrian opposition in Fua’ah and Kafraya and the Islamic State in Deir-Ezzor). This encompassed nearly 10 percent (2.5 million) of Syria’s pre-war population (Siege Watch, 2019: 7). The final siege ended in mid-2018 with the evacuation and relocation of opposition forces and civilians from Rastan, Talbiseh, and Houleh in northern Homs.
Siege Warfare in Syria
The strategic use of sieges, which came to be known as “starve, surrender, slaughter” tactics, was quite successful. In 2012, the Syrian military and its affiliated militias cordoned off rebel-held communities to prevent the spread of the opposition and punish those communities opposing state authority. The sieges were coordinated and planned (IICISAR, 2018: 5), the majority of which were centralized around the greater Damascus area. The Syrian government extended blockades to tens of communities on the periphery of Damascus, restricted the free movement of civilians, inflows of humanitarian aid and medical supplies, and launched indiscriminate attacks against critical infrastructure in densely populated areas. These sieges varied in terms of size, length, and intensity. Some ranged from a few months to over five years. Some primarily faced starvation and indiscriminate artillery and gunfire; meanwhile, others faced full aerial bombardments and chemical weapons attacks (E.g. Douma). A common tactic among the majority of sieges was the exploitation of aid and access. The government’s restriction of inflows of aid and critical resources produced destitute conditions among civilian populations. Food and water insecurity led to acute malnutrition and deaths among the elderly and children. The UN reported that in the besieged town of Madaya, upon a rare delivery of humanitarian relief, residents and their children were forced to forage for grass for food (UNHCR, 2016).
Prior to Russian intervention in 2015, the Syrian government primarily resorted to starvation as the means of inducing surrender. But, the advent of Russian intervention into the conflict brought a new power dynamic and broker to the Syrian government which provided the Syrian military the advantage necessary to heighten the destructive power of the sieges (PAX, 2019: 18). With improved military capabilities, the Syrian military intensified violence against besieged communities in order to hasten capitulation through physical destruction. Without any guarantees of external intervention to prevent the destruction of these communities and ensure the protection of civilian lives, town after town yielded to the Syrian government, accepting one-sided terms of capitulation—evacuation from besieged areas to other opposition areas in Syria. Those that did not initially capitulate would later do so following the government’s “final scorched earth offensives” against larger besieged areas like those in Aleppo City (in 2016) and Eastern Ghouta (in 2018) (Ibid: 18). The final stage of high intensity violence targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure included the use of chemical weapons, cluster bombs, barrel bombs, and incendiary munitions. Under the conditions of the prohibitive measures, besieged communities eventually capitulated resulting in regime victory.
The Facade of Access and De-escalation.
Ahead of the final round of military operations against the remaining opposition-controlled including besieged Ghouta and northern Homs in 2017, Russia took the reins over the political negotiations in Syria at the Astana Peace Process in June 2017. As besieged opposition groups in northern Homs and eastern Ghouta entrenched their positions despite escalating Russian and Syrian violence, the Russians proposed a new broader de-escalation strategy at the Astana Peace Talks to freeze the conflict in Syria. The plan—guaranteed by Turkey, Russian, and Iran—envisioned four de-escalation zones (also referred to as “safe zones” or “safe areas”) over Idlib, northern Homs, eastern Ghouta, and southwestern Syria (Dara’a and Qunietra) with the aim of ending the violence, improving the humanitarian situation, and creating favourable conditions for a final political settlement (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017). Even further, the agreement called for rapid, safe, and unhindered humanitarian access to besieged areas as well as suitable conditions for the delivery of medical aid. For a moment, many observers, including this author, held their breath in anticipation that the agreement might indicate a new direction away from the siege tactics of the first five years of conflict. The international community slowly acquiesced to the Astana agreement, and even those who rejected its legitimacy did not intervene to obstruct Russian diplomatic efforts. Interestingly, the de-escalation agreement spurred new diplomatic engagements between Russia and other external actors in Syria. To the south, the United States, Russia, and Jordan arrived at an agreement for the de-escalation of violence in Dara’a and Qunietra. To the north, the de-escalation agreement laid the groundwork for discussions over the future of Idlib, which would evolve more slowly than the other zones. For the first time in months, there seemed to be diplomatic progress between international actors. But, without the support of the Syrian opposition, de-escalation was a top-down policy attempt whose failure was inevitable. Over the next year, hopes of progress deteriorated as, one by one, the remaining opposition enclaves collapsed under renewed military operations
By October 2017, Russia’s diplomatic maneuvering in Astana better positioned it to provide critical political, diplomatic, and military coverage for the Syrian government. The resumption of hostilities between the Syrian military against besieged areas signaled that the promise of reduced violence and increased humanitarian access were not the intended goals of the de-escalation agreement. Instead, Syria and Russia utilized a relative lull in conflict and the comprehensive ceasefire as an opportunity to freeze the conflict in western Syria and focus their attention to developments in the East. The de-escalation agreement was a war management strategy for the regime (Itani, in Osseiran, 2018). Between June and September 2017, Syrian forces and their allies mobilized eastward for several months of fighting to recapture ISIS territory along the southern bank of the Euphrates River and break the ISIS-siege of the remaining government-held areas in Deir-ez-zor. With the de-escalation of conflict in the west, Syrian forces recaptured the majority of the eastern desert, with the exception of the US-controlled 55 kilometer zone at the Jordan-Iraq-Syria tri-border.
After securing the east, Syrian forces remobilized eastward for a final round of military operations. In October, fighting resumed in Idlib, rural Hama, and eastern Ghouta in what ICRC referred to as the “worst levels of violence since the battle for Aleppo in 2016” (ICRC, 2017). The conflict would spread to all of the de-escalation zones by early 2018, with Russia providing diplomatic and military support for the Syrian military and its allies. From February 18 to March 3, 2018, over 1,000 Syrians were killed in eastern Ghouta (MSF, 2018). Ghouta fell in April. By June, Syrian forces began moving south in preparation for a final battle over the opposition stronghold in the southwest in violation of the Russian plan. the Syrian government recaptured the remaining opposition enclaves, with the exception of Idlib, which at the time of writing, remains an active conflict zone. In all 55 cases of government-led sieges, the opposition eventually accepted the terms of surrender, were systematically evacuated from recaptured areas and displaced to opposition-held areas—most often, Idlib.
The Longest Siege: A Subcase Study of Eastern Ghouta
The Syrian military’s five-year siege of eastern Ghouta, a suburb of Damascus, was the longest and, perhaps, most violent example of state violence against its people in pursuit of victory over the opposition. Beginning in April 2013, the Syrian government and its allies blockaded eastern Ghouta and laid siege to it, all the while subjecting civilians to ground offensives, aerial bombardments, indiscriminate bombing of infrastructure (homes, hospitals, markets, and more), and the suspected use of chemical weapons. Such attacks occurred on a continuum with intermittent periods of escalation and de-escalation closely following political, diplomatic, and humanitarian developments in the broader conflict. The use of starvation and the denial of humanitarian assistance and humanitarian access to civilians in need persisted throughout the course of the siege played a vital role in the process of recapturing the area. By intensifying a humanitarian crisis in eastern Ghouta, the Syrian government exhausted both opposition fighters and civilians to the point of surrender and, in many cases, death.
Shortly after the beginning of the siege, regime forces cut off fuel access to Eastern Ghouta forcing civilians to burn rubbish for electricity to the area. Some areas, such as Douma, were cut off from water access, forcing residents to dig and pump water from informal wells in order to access water (IICISAR, 2018: 8). In order to survive, local residents only accessed food obtained from local farming, smuggling, or purchased from local profiteers at extortive prices (Siege Watch, 2016: 26; ICCISAR, 2018: 8). Smuggling tunnels provided the most efficient means of civilian and military transportation. Those in urgent need of medical treatment could be smuggled out of the area for medical assistance. Goods, such as food and medicine, as well as military resources—weapons and ammunition—moved through these tunnels. However, as the Syrian government gained ground in eastern Ghouta, tunnels became inaccessible. Humanitarian actors and observers reported the rapid deterioration of the humanitarian situation as the compounding emergencies coalesced. High intensity regime bombardments damaged schools, markets, shelters, and hospitals, limiting resident’s access to basic medical services, fuel and food, and drinking water (REACH, 2018). Most often, the conditions within eastern Ghouta compounded on the already heightened vulnerability of residents. Conditions deteriorated to the point where each individual subsisted on one meal of boiled corn or lentils each day (HRC, A/HRC/38/CRP.3, 2018).
Beyond the use of starvation and blockades, government forces and their allies systematically prevented the entry of humanitarian aid—food, non-food items, and medicine—to residents of eastern Ghouta. The Syrian government’s consenting authority became a central hindrance to the delivery of aid to Ghouta. In most cases, permission for UN convoys were routinely denied (ICCISAR, 2018: 8; UNSC, S/2016/272, 2016). In the rare occasions humanitarian convoys were permitted, the delivery of relief was exploited by Syrian military forces and government authorities. On several occasions, items intended for delivery to besieged areas were removed from humanitarian convoys prior to their journey or in transit. In 2016, a portion of medical supplies intended for eastern Ghouta were removed by the Syrian Ministry of Health from the convoy, despite prior authority from Syrian authorities (UNSC, S/2016/272, 2016). On March 5, 2018, at the height of the regime’s final operation to retake the territory, an approved interagency convoy of UN, Syrian Arab Red Crescent, and ICRC actors were held up at a government checkpoint at the entrance of the besieged area, and regime forces stripped the convoy of 70 percent of its medical supplies headed for 27,500 residents in besieged areas (ICCISAR, 2018: 8).
Even after the Astana process and the Russian-led de-escalation agreement over eastern Ghouta provided early hopes of a permanent ceasefire and unhindered humanitarian access to besieged residents, the permissions for UN deliveries rarely came. From the period of November 2017 through January 2018, no aid convoys were approved for delivery to besieged areas (Egeland, 2018). In February 2018, Jan Egeland, Special Advisor to Special Envoy for Syria, noted that the approvals for deliveries were at an “all-time low (Ibid).” Addressing the political debate over responsibility for de-escalating violence, provocations, and ensuring access to besieged areas, Egeland expressed, “I am so fed up with the counterarguments that these men [sponsors of both government and opposition actors on both sides of the conflict] in offices, in suits and uniforms always have for why they are not allowing crossline [access] to the civilians on the other side” (Egeland, 2018). He called for a “humanitarian pause” because conditions in Ghouta had reached critical levels “where civilians cannot be treated, helped, reached, [or] assisted.” But, no meaningful pause for humanitarian access, aid, or medical evacuations would come before the government’s final military operation pushed opposition groups to a final surrender and evacuation. At the conclusion of the siege only 120,000 civilians remained after its recapture in April 2018, down from its pre-war population of 1.5 million (IICISAR, 2018: 9).
The Syrian government’s victory in eastern Ghouta is not a testament of its military prowess, but rather an example of how exploitative tactics employed as a part of a siege (such as denying assistance and access to civilians) can effectively exhaust and break an opponent. Through the systemic process of starvation, denial of food and medical assistance, and the targeted destruction of critical infrastructure, compounding vulnerabilities in eastern Ghouta—the outbreak of disease, acute food insecurity, the exploitation of civilians by armed groups within besieged zones, etc.—slowly eroded the strength and resources of besieged communities until they surrendered. The political stalemate over humanitarian assistance which persisted through the course of the siege only aided Syrian forces who needed to apply minimal pressure to secure the blockade and wait.
Did Sieges Work?
Why did the regime rely so heavily on the use of siege warfare at the expense of civilians? Put simply, it worked. Quite well, in fact. By systematically blockading civilian areas, the Syrian government contained the spread of opposition groups in western Syria early in the conflict. Instead of protracted, high intensity battles against opposition fighters, the selective use of violence with a tight blockade on humanitarian assistance exhausted opposition forces and their resources. This form of collective punishment targeted all within besieged areas, often harming the most vulnerable (women, elderly, and children). It is worth mentioning the role that Russia played in this episode, both as a military actor, but even more so as a political trustee for the Syrian government within the United Nations. From 2011 to 2018, Russia vetoed twelve UNSC draft resolutions condemning the Syrian government’s violence against civilians and violations of human rights including the use of chemical weapons and ceasefire agreements (most notably for a ceasefire in Aleppo in 2016 and eastern Ghouta in 2018). Russia’s veto power prevented the UNSC from collective action, which contributed to greater bilateral and multilateral action by the United States and its allies in the form of sanctions and, later, one-off strikes.
When US Ambassador to the UN Samantha Power addressed the UN Security Council (UNSC, SC/12624, 2016) at the height of the Syrian government’s siege of eastern Aleppo City on December 13, 2016, she warned that, if unabated, the regime and its allies would “replicate their starve-and-surrender-and-slaughter tactics elsewhere.” She was right, such tactics would provide a reproducible model for recapturing opposition enclaves in primary areas of interest of Syria. In all 55 cases of government-led sieges, the opposition eventually accepted the terms of surrender, were systematically evacuated from recaptured areas and displaced to opposition-held areas—most often, Idlib.
The fall of Ghouta in April marked a significant turning point for the Syrian government. It seems that the lack of meaningful external UN, bilateral, or multilateral action against the Syrian military’s final operations on besieged communities foretold that further military operations in the southwest or Idlib might not provoke external intervention. To this end, the Syrian government tested the US commitment to both the opposition and the de-escalation agreement. Despite US warnings of “serious repercussions” if Russia and Syria violated of the southwestern de-escalation zone, when regime forces invaded the southwest, the United States did not engage. On June 24, 2018, I received a private message from an opposition commander with the Southern Front (SF)—US-backed Free Syrian Army branch operating in southwest Syria with whom I regularly conversed while previously working in Jordan—forwarding me a statement from the US Department of State, alerting them that they should not base their decision to fight the regime on the “assumption or expectation of military intervention” from the United States.[1] The United States decision to withdraw support from the SF offered regime forces a greenlight to attach the southwest. In doing so, the inaction of the United States permitted the violation of its trilateral de-escalation agreement. And, in doing so, opposition were on their own to face the Syrian army. Dara’a and Qunietra fell only one month later.
In conclusion, the Syrian government carried out five years of a brutal warfare, relying on starvation, preventing the entry of basic goods and impeding humanitarian access to civilian populations to systemically induce surrender and secure military victory. Beyond the restriction of humanitarian aid, Russia’s promise of humanitarian access on behalf of the Syrian government as part of a broader de-escalation agreement offered hope to UN actors and governments desperate to end the violence against civilians. But, instead of breaking the sieges and opening humanitarian access, the call for humanitarian assistance and access under the framework of de-escalation served as a conflict-management strategy to allow Syrian forces to freeze the conflict and selective recapture areas of Syria while conflict in others remained suppressed with minimum force. In effect, all 55 of the besieged communities in Syria returned to government hands by 2018, allowing the regime to consolidate its control over western Syria.
[1] For further confirmation of message, see Vivian Yee and Hwaida Saad, “Syrian Assault Flouts U.S.-Backed Cease-Fire and Sets Off New Exodus,” New York Times, June 29, 2018.