What Iran Learned from the War
After traveling the past month and meeting with a number of sides of the Iran conflict since the MoU signing, I wanted to lay out some thoughts for consideration.
The recent conflict appears to have fundamentally reshaped how many Iranian strategists think about deterrence, sovereignty, and regional power. While it remains too early to know which lessons will ultimately prove enduring, several themes consistently emerge from discussions about how Tehran is interpreting the war.
First, the conflict reinforced the strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz. From Iran’s perspective, the war demonstrated that the Strait could be weaponized against Iran just as easily as it can be exploited by Iran as deterrence. Rather than diminishing its importance, the conflict strengthened Tehran’s belief that exercising greater control over Hormuz is essential to overcoming future vulnerabilities. For many hardliners, the Strait has become an indispensable source of leverage in negotiations that Iran cannot afford to surrender. The prevailing view in Iran is that the pre-war status quo regarding Hormuz is no longer acceptable, and GCC calls for a return to it are a non-starter.
This thinking extends simply military strategy. The Iranian leadership seeks to exercise “legal” control by claiming territorial sovereignty over its portion of the Strait of Hormuz, reportedly in coordination with Oman. The objective is both the obvious gain in operational control and the gradual establishment of a new regional arrangement (the new status quo) that Gulf Arab states may eventually accept. This effort includes advancing legal arguments to build an international legal case supporting Iran’s interpretation of its rights in the Strait. From this view, the use of force as a de facto control mechanism to close and control the Strait is a wartime necessity that would eventually be recognized as legal authority down the line.
The war also appears to have reinforced an important distinction in Tehran’s thinking regarding the nuclear issue. Iranian officials differentiate between preserving the country’s nuclear program and maintaining highly enriched uranium stockpiles. Their interpretation of the conflict is that the United States has, in practice, accepted Iran’s right to maintain a civilian nuclear program. Enrichment to approximately 3.5 percent is viewed as compatible with that objective, while the accumulation of 60 percent enriched uranium was primarily intended as a source of strategic leverage rather than an end in itself. The continuation of the nuclear program remains a non-negotiable red line on the Iranian side. The prevailing Iranian logic might argue that if the source of the threat (Israel or United States’ military action) is removed, then Iran would cease its pursuit of a nuclear weapon (or weapons-grade uranium). This logic, however, leaves unresolved a broader regional concern from the Gulf Arab States who view Iran’s projection of power through direct strikes and its regional proxies as a threat independent of the nuclear file. It seems that a cessation of the war may end the strikes on GCC states, but it does not resolve the question of Iranian proxies, the nuclear issue, or Hormuz.
Domestically, the war appears to have altered Iran’s political environment. While it did not necessarily increase support for the government itself, it appears to have fostered greater national unity in the face of external attack. Some interlocators argued that the prospect of externally supported regime change has effectively disappeared for the foreseeable future. As one assessment put it, “There will not be any kind of riots or protests because no one can go to the streets due to the risk attack.” Whether accurate or not, this perception may increase the regime’s confidence and willingness to escalate during future crises.
Perhaps the most significant lesson regards deterrence. Iranian strategists increasingly believe they have established the legitimacy to strike the United States and its regional partners directly from Iranian territory as part of a credible deterrence posture. At the same time, Iran’s participation in the negotiations are viewed as a means of preserving and rebuilding what remains of Iran’s regional network, particularly Hezbollah. Rather than abandoning the Axis of Resistance, Tehran appears intent on reconstructing it while pairing it with a stronger emphasis on homeland deterrence through direct attacks on GCC states. The lesson Iranian officials drew from the period following October 7 was that Iran’s restraint toward Israel was interpreted as weakness and ultimately invited further Israeli military action in Lebanon and Syria. The result is likely a more self-confident Iran seeking to combine direct deterrence from its mainland with a renewed regional forward-defense strategy. That is not to say that Iran is actively rebuilding Hezbollah (as such thinking is often justified by Israeli forces to justify the ongoing invasion). Rather, the existence of the debate over the continued (or expanded use) of proxies within Iran merits further consideration.
Looking ahead, the logic suggests that if another major conflict emerges, Iran would likely seek to expand the battlefield beyond the immediate theater by opening additional military fronts. Such an approach would be intended to complicate its adversaries’ military planning, increase the costs of escalation, and reinforce the credibility of its broader deterrence strategy.
Whether these lessons accurately reflect the realities of the conflict is ultimately less important than the fact that they appear to be shaping Iran’s strategic outlook. Wars do not simply change the balance of power; they change how states understand power itself. If these interpretations take hold within Tehran’s strategic community, they are likely to influence Iranian decision-making long after the fighting has ended.