Winning With Words: China’s Rhetoric Driven Foreign Policy in the Arab World
China has made considerable steps to expand its influence in the Middle East and prioritize the deepening of relations with the Middle East states. Sino-Middle East ties are not new, and Beijing has enjoyed decades-long relations with many countries in the Middle East. However, the Middle East has occupied a considerable degree of Chinese state engagement over the past few years. This growing trend line of Chinese engagement in the Middle East is the product of President Xi Jinping’s push to expand coordination and cooperation with key states in the region to create a greater degree of stability and more durable regimes. These efforts aimed to reverse what Xi perceived as regional instability brought on by the Arab Spring in 2011.
The Middle East has long occupied China’s strategic periphery. The region’s rich energy resources are historically a pillar of China’s domestic rapid development, and predictable access to the region’s energy markets are a major consideration of China’s regional foreign policy. Over the past decade, Chinese investment in the Persian Gulf, especially in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries has soared. The GCC and China found in each other a willing partner to advance strategic objectives for longer term economic prosperity. For China, Gulf capital underpinned Beijing’s own quest for energy independence, while broad ranges of cooperation between both opened the doors for investment into everything from manufacturing to space. For the Gulf, China represented a strategic partner for economic diversification away from fossil fuels and domestic economic revitalization under the various regional economic projects, especially Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030. Other forms of cooperation included cultural exchange, defense and military exchanges, and even increased tourism.
One glaring issue (or rather a conglomeration of issues into a single category) remains a major spoiler to the long-term endurance of the Sino-Arab ties–the lack of predictable security across the Middle East. For their part, Beijing sees the Gulf as a stable market for comprehensive cooperation and investment, but many of its neighbors in the Levant and North Africa pose serious concerns to Beijing’s regional policies, as well as for the future economic ambitions of Gulf states.
To safeguard against these potential spoilers, Beijing has sought to assert itself more aggressively within regional diplomacy, mediation, and coordination with Middle East countries. While not a new ambition, Beijing’s self-confidence in this regard has heightened the resolve of Chinese officials to craft a regional order less in the vision of western hegemony and one where Middle East states, especially the Gulf powers, seek “their own futures” through coordination and cooperation with Beijing. China has clothed its ambitions in the region through the language of regional coordination and multilateral dialogue as a platform for diminishing both the region’s perceived need for and reliance on the West, especially the United States. In other words, a region in which competitors reduce or constrain their interregional security dilemmas (mutual competition) is less dependent on the United States for security and, instead, can collaborate to tackle mutual “non-traditional” security challenges in the region, such as energy and food security.
This vision for regional order is an amalgamation of ideas, strategies, and discourse, rooted in President Xi Jinping’s Global Security Initiative, alongside a spectrum of peace proposals aimed at Gulf security, including the 2023 Saudi-Iran rapprochement and the Israel-Palestine conflict. It further incorporates China's philosophy of promoting development as a pathway to peace and embraces the principles of non-traditional security, a legacy of the Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao administrations. This blend of concepts represents a strategic endeavor to reshape regional dynamics, but lacks a clear vision of an “alternative” to the existing status quo.
Despite a lack of clarity in regional order building, China’s rhetoric has landed with its Arab audiences, and is scoring dividends in its Middle East diplomacy.
A “China Solution” for the Developing world?
China’s political pitch to the global south revolves around the idea of the “China Solution” (Zhongguo fang’an 中国方案), a concept introduced by Xi in 2014 to differentiate Beijing’s approach to order over that of the west. This sentiment, with rhetorical familiarity to the Beijing Consensus or “China model” discourse is an assertion that one nation can pursue its own interests without imposing national values on other countries - in other words the rejection of a perceived western model of hegemony.
The thread of this concept has grown increasingly prevalent in China’s political outreach to partner countries, especially in the Middle East. Beijing’s Global Security Initiative concept paper outright condemned hegemony and underscored the right of nations to pursue their own security, albeit through Beijing’s own framework. At the 10th Beijing Xiangshan Forum, China’s Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs more directly reflected these sentiments when he stated that China’s approach “…is neither the old path of colonization and plunder, or the crooked path taken by some counties to seek hegemony once they grow strong…but the right course of peaceful development.” The uniqueness of this statement, beyond its implicit nudge at the West, is a pushback to the broader criticism both in the West and among developing countries of China’s BRI as a mechanism for cultivating influence through debt and, as then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton termed BRI, “new colonialism”. Xi reiterated this view at a party study session in February 2023, noting that, “China’s modernization has broken the myth that ‘modernization equals westernization’, it has expanded the possibilities of paths for developing countries to modernize and provided a Chinese solution for mankind’s search for a better social system.”
This view underpins many of China’s new global initiatives - the Global Development Initiative, GSI, and the Global Civilizations Initiative - and, as some scholars argued, signals China’s ambition to shape agendas in multilateral settings. These initiatives seek to deepen ties between China and the developing world, while also cultivating legitimacy for its image, for its vision of order, and its leadership within that order. One major contributor to this legitimacy is Beijing’s general success drawing and sustaining the attention of developing countries in the Middle East. This is partially due to Beijing’s rhetorical emphasis on development as the driver of stability, as opposed to human rights or hard security, which Arab governments tend to favor.
While the efficacy of China’s initiatives can certainly be debated, the welcome China has received from many states in the Middle East cannot. Beijing’s rhetoric has taken root in the region. Certain factors, such as the “development as peace” rhetoric, has built a captive audience, especially those nations lagging in their own domestic development. This rhetoric, coupled with a major economic push to deepen ties with key leaders of the developing world - notably BRICs - has, to an extent, improved China’s standing, especially in parts of the Middle East where the perception is locally held that the U.S. influence in the Middle East is in retreat.
Rhetorical consistency over substance
Some may speculate that the more receptive the Middle East is to China’s rhetoric, the higher the likelihood Arab audiences will eventually expect China to play a more active role in the region. China, however, has so far skirted regional expectations of a larger role in resolving the Middle East’s many regional challenges, while still benefiting from its rhetoric. One way it has succeeded is by maintaining a remarkable degree of consistency in its message to Arab audiences on key regional issues. For instance, Beijing has held roughly the same stance on the Middle East peace process and the Palestinian issue. This consistency resonates with the Arab population across the region, who, despite decades of stagnant Arab policies toward Palestine, still place substantial importance on the Palestinian question. This alignment has somewhat boosted China's popularity in these regions. While this popularity may not be overwhelming, it is sufficient to support, rather than impede, bilateral relations and cooperative initiatives. However, this stance has not been without its political costs, especially during times of heightened conflict, such as during the 2023 Gaza War. This was perhaps one of the first periods in recent memory where Sino-Israeli relations have reached their weakest point.
Israeli officials have often tolerated China’s rhetorical support for Palestine because the major economic benefits of bilateral Sino-Israeli ties far outweigh any Israeli frustration with Beijing’s diplomatic and rhetorical support for Palestine. China’s unwillingness to condemn Hamas and active support for Palestine following Hamas’ brutal October 7 attack on Israel and Israel’s brutal war and retaliation starting a day later. China’s rhetorical commitment to its core messaging on Palestine in the days and weeks following the start of the war won it a seat at the table with the Arab states. While this seat paled in comparison to the role of the US - Israel’s principle backer - and primary mediator with the Arab world, it signaled that China had staked its future with the Arabs, communicated through its diplomatic messaging around Gaza. As Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi expressed to the Malaysian FM, “On the issue of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, China has always stood on the side of peace, on the side of international law, and on the side of the legitimate demands of the majority of Arab and Islamic countries.”
China’s growing clout with the Arabs have enabled Beijing to use its regional diplomacy to encourage interArab cooperation and regional rapprochement. While the US pushes Saudi-Israeli normalization, Beijing used it’s good offices to formalize Saudi-Iran rapprochement, a process which began with Iraq and Oman. China, an avid supporter of Bashar Al Assad, has also used its global prowess to protect and legitimize Assad in the international community. While Syria’s normalization to the Arab world and reintegration to the Arab league was largely a regional project, China extended diplomatic and political legitimacy to the negotiations and eventual diplomatic breakthrough. Beijing has also offered mediation through its senior leaders to other conflicts, notably Israel-Palestine, Yemen, and Syria. These however are largely high visibility gestures designed to win public favor and improve China’s image.
Is it working?
In December 2022, Chinese President Xi Jinping declared to a packed convention center of Arab heads of state and government officials in Saudi Arabia at the China-Arab Summit a new era of Sino-Arab relations. China and the Arab world, while enjoying historic relations, were entering a period of strategic shift. China’s ties with the Middle East are historically transactional, but Beijing has persistently steered bilateral and regional ties with the Arab world toward a more strategic direction. A number of scholars have written at length regarding the varying vectors of this engagement, including expanded cooperation in trade, energy, investment, cultural exchange, among others.
Over the past few years, the volume of capital committed to joint cooperation has reached the tens of billions, with the GCC receiving the lionshare of investment. For the GCC, deepening ties with China is a cornerstone of ambitious economic diversification agendas, like Saudi’s Vision 2030. Gulf nations, long dependent on oil revenue for economic prosperity now aim to gradually replace economic dependence of fossil fuels and transform the GCC region into a center of global industry. These efforts are entirely dependent on China, but also incorporate a deeper opening of the GCC to South and East Asia. New atypical economic groupings, termed “minilateralism” by some scholars, between the GCC countries and Asian powers, like India, are redrawing the map of traditional Middle East partnerships.
Building on these trends, Gulf countries are diversifying their economies, but also their political partners, minimizing the over reliance on any single partner, with the exception of the United States in the realm of national security. For the Gulf, deeper strategic ties with China are apart of a broader effort to cement their hegemony in the political economy of a broader Middle East and North Africa while shoring up economic and political stability at home. These mini lateral groupings are not new, but the geopolitical moment has opened the door for middle powers, particularly the GCC countries, to benefit by collectivizing and centralizing their individual and collective influence to enhance their bargaining power vis a vis great powers.
The I2U2 grouping is one example. The initiative championed by the US to bring India, Israel, the UAE, and the US into a new economic partnership was pitched by US officials as a counter to China’s regional influence, but rather served as an open door for the middle powers to yield deeper economic benefits of cooperation. The UAE, who maintains deep ties with China, did not bend or reduce any cooperation with Beijing, rather it depended the centrality of its economy as a global player. Another example - the India-Middle East- Europe Corridor (IMEC) - a new economic and trade network connecting India to Europe through interconnected lines of communication (including aid, sea, land, and rail). The Biden administration touted the IMEC corridor as an alternative to China’s BRI in the Middle East, but the real power brokers in the process - the GCC - saw the IMEC not as an alternative to BRI but a strategic opportunity to centralize the Gulf as a global manufacturing and supply chain hub. This attractive position - if fully realized - may actually generate greater opportunities for Chinese companies operating in the Gulf who can benefit from trade benefits of the new arrangements.
For China, these developments only further cement the GCC and broader Arab world as a global south hub of industry and opportunity. China’s leaders see these trend lines and seek to cement these ties early in the process. This allows Beijing to leverage its global status to enhance the legitimacy of GCC states, cultivate an image among the Arab world as a reliable partner and support of Arab causes, and presenting itself as a regional alternative to the current order in the region, an order which China curiously does not seek to upset but rather provoke.
While energy concerns still bind these two regions, both the Arab world and China have sought to extract a broader range of benefits ranging from tangible security and economic prosperity to greater international legitimacy and deeper social ties. The driver of deepening ties revolves around preserving China’s predictable and sustainable access to energy resources to continue fueling its economic growth.
Endnotes:
David Kelly, “The ‘China Solution’: Beijing responds to Trump,” The Lowy Institute, February 17, 2017, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/china-solution-beijing-responds-trump; Jia Wenshan, “Xi's inclusive thought offers China solution to the world,” China Daily, January 30, 2018.
Xiaoshuo Hou, “Dissecting China's Rise: Controversies over the China Model,” China Perspectives, No. 2 (98) (2014), pp. 61-67. https://www.jstor.org/stable/24055618; Maria Adele Carrai, “In the Eye of the Beholder: The China Model as a discourse,” Fairbanks Center for Chinese Studies, May 17, 2018. https://fairbank.fas.harvard.edu/research/blog/in-the-eye-of-the-beholder-the-china-model-as-a-discourse.
Michael McCall, “The Beijing Consensus and Its Relevance in the Arab Gulf,” Baker Institute for Public Policy, October 4, 2018. https://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/beijing-consensus-and-its-relevance-arab-gulf
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Global Security Initiative Concept Paper,” February 21, 2023. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/202302/t20230221_11028348.html.
Xi Jinping, “Chinese modernization on right course of peaceful development: Xi,” March 15, 2023. http://en.people.cn/n3/2023/0315/c90000-10222976.html.
Reuters, “Clinton warns against “new colonialism” in Africa,” June 11, 2011. https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE75A0RI/.
Kevin Rudd, “Xi Jinping’s February 7 Address to the Central Party School,” Asia Society, February 2023. https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/chinas-competing-ideological-and-economic-policy-objectives-2023.
Michael Schuman, Jonathan Fulton, and Tuvia Gering, “How Beijing’s newest global initiatives seek to remake the world order, ” Atlantic Council, June 21, 2023. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/how-beijings-newest-global-initiatives-seek-to-remake-the-world-order/.
Arab Barometer Data Set, Seventh Wave of Arab Barometer Surveys, https://www.arabbarometer.org/2023/02/as-great-power-competition-in-the-middle-east-heats-up-polling-data-shows-a-complex-picture-of-popular-attitudes/;
For more on China’s “development as peace,” see Kowk Chung Wong, “The Rise of China’s Developmental Peace: Can an Economic Approach to Peacebuilding Create Sustainable Peace?” Global Society, Vol. 35, no. 4, 2021. Pp. 522-540. https://doi.org/10.1080/13600826.2021.1942802.