China's Political Party Outreach in the Middle East: An Overview
This paper has evolved over a few years of discussions and research around how China engages in party-to-party dialogue with the Arab world. This is a new area of research, so I do approach it with a degree of humility.
The China-Arab States Political Parties Dialogue (CAPPD) has become a emerging, but notable part of China’s diplomatic strategy in the Middle East. Launched in 2016, the dialogue offers the Chinese communist party a carefully structured platform for ideological engagement and political alignment with Arab elites. The CAPPD provides a forum where China’s governance model, articulated through Xi Jinping Thought on Governance and Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, is taught and socialized with Arab political elites. These exchanges allow Beijing to shape its own political narrative in the Arab world and advance its vision of a new order, one that is increasingly multipolar and aligned with Beijing’s interests.
From the CPC View
From the party’s view, their external work transcends ideological and social system divides, which positions the party as a leader in shaping a global network of political party partnerships that aim to promote stable state relations. According to Xi, political parties worldwide should enhance mutual trust, improve communication, and create new forms of party relations based on mutual respect and learning. However, the rhetoric of cooperation often is often not rooted in in the free exchange of ideas, but in positioning China’s governance model as a central point of learning for other nations. In essence, these political dialogues are part of a broader interest in aligning foreign political elites with Chinese strategic priorities.
The Party both deepened cooperation with Marxist and progressive parties globally, but also strategically engages with non-Marxist political systems to broaden the range of stakeholders—the Middle East is no exception. The CPC’s institutionalized exchanges with major countries, especially in the developing world, and with major political parties, is a structured initiative to socialize China’s political philosophy into foreign governance systems. Currently, the party maintains regular contact with over 500 political parties and organizations worldwide, creating a network for exchange and cooperation across various forms and levels. These exchanges transcend ideological and social system differences. Chinese officials are clear that this does not involve "importing" foreign models or "exporting" the Chinese model. This framing, however, is somewhat disingenuous. In practice, the CCP is exporting its governance model by showcasing the "success" of China's political system under Xi Jinping's leadership and promoting it as the key to both national and regional stability.
For more on defining this model, see my paper series on China’s approach to development in conflict areas.
The CPC’s emphasis on "cooperation over confrontation" can disguise what can be perceived as the one-sided nature of these engagements. The Party’s approach focuses on integrating China’s leadership into the political frameworks of partner states. This does allow for China to advocate greater ideological diversity - expecially in promoting ideas which either align with its own or contribute to undermine those of the west in the international system. For example, in its dialogue with Russia, China has not only deepened political trust but also strengthened its strategic partnership and underscored the benefits of alignment with Chinese interests in global governance, especially for countries on the periphery of global affairs (e.g. North Korea, Iran, and previously Syria). This approach has also helped deepen China’s footprint in Africa and the Middle East. Egypt and Algeria stand out as prominant examples.
In the Middle East context, the dialogue is an important part of China’s broader “trinity approach” (三位一体) to diplomacy, which encompasses three forms of outreach: party diplomacy, public diplomacy, and non-government diplomacy.
Together, these strands of diplomatic engagement allow China to target key segments of foreign societies—political elites, civil society, think tanks, and the general population—while using these channels to mutually reinforce its strategic image and diplomatic objectives. Through these avenues, Chinese officials work to cultivate long-term validators in Arab society beyond Middle East states by investing in cultivating the next generation of political leadership. This is an investment to ensure that Arab states’ policies and public sentiment gradually align with China’s geopolitical priorities long-term. Wang Chao, President of the Chinese People’s Institute for Foreign Affairs argued that people-to-people diplomacy is “more effective in presenting China’s political and economic standing and cultural appeal, thus fostering a more favorable public opinion of China across the world.” A number of adjacent state-linked institutions facilitate this process in coordination with the Party.
China’s United Front (统一战线工作) Work Department and its partners are known to cultivate influence overseas and bolster China’s circle of friends globally. Dubbed by Xi as the party’s “magic weapon,” the United Front is a global network of organizations, institutions, individuals, and, in some cases, intelligence entities, whose work aims, more generally, to maintain and extend the power of the Chinese state through cultivating influence in and through overseas Chinese communities in areas of strategic importance, as well as to build influence among politicians, scholars, religious and business associations, and companies of various sorts and alignments in target countries and regions. In the former context, United Front activities aim to “guide” as opposed to “leading” overseas Chinese communities to proactively participate in serving CCP agendas in the countries they reside and in activities which strengthens and supports China’s foreign policy priorities. In the latter, the Chinese leadership has revived Mao-era policies of “making the past serve the present, make the foreign serve China” (古为今用, 洋为中用), an approach of using multitrack engagements—people-to-people, party-to- party, and PRC enterprise-to-foreign enterprise—to cultivate influence among foreigners and promote China’s foreign policy objectives.
See the CPC Central Committee’s paper on the party’s external work: 宋 涛：党的对外工作是中国特色大国外交的重要体现.
Building Political Capital through Party Diplomacy
For the Middle East, the political parties dialogue primarily functions as a political elite engagement platform. The CAPPD, launched in 2016 and convened every two years, has established itself as the primary platform for political engagement between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Arab political parties. Each session brings together representatives from the CCP Central Committee and political leaders from across the Arab world, facilitating direct exchanges and dialogue.
The first two dialogues, held in 2016 and 2018, took place in China under the auspices of the CCP’s International Department. However, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the 2020 and 2022 sessions transitioned to a hybrid format, allowing for broader participation through large-scale online engagement with a wider range of Arab political parties.
At these events, Arab political leaders have participated in hands-on training sessions and received instruction in core CCP ideology, including Xi Jinping Thought on Governance, Socialism with Chinese Characteristics in the New Era, and other foundational party doctrines. Through this platform, China has cultivated relationships with Arab political figures, working to align their priorities with Beijing’s broader regional and global interests. Arab political leaders and party officials are immersed in a process of ideological training that aligns them with China’s vision of governance and global leadership. This kind of political outreach aims to deepen diplomatic ties and shape political cultures in the Arab world to ensure a sustained, ideologically-informed alignment with China’s long-term goals.
The 2023 session in Yinchuan is a prime example. This brought together political leaders, party representatives, and think tank members from 19 Arab countries and 67 political parties and organizations. Several key speakers addressed the forum to discuss China’s growing influence in the Arab world and the role of BRI. Hassan Benomar, a member of the political bureau of Morocco's Rassemblement National des Independants (RNI) and deputy speaker of the Moroccan House of Representatives, emphasized Morocco’s role as the first North African country to sign a Belt and Road cooperation agreement with China. He highlighted the significant contributions of Chinese investments in infrastructure, technology, and economic development, positioning Morocco as an important gateway in the Mediterranean region. Similarly, Saleban Daher Bile, a member of the executive bureau of Djibouti’s People's Rally for Progress (RPP) and secretary general of the Djibouti National Assembly, underscored China’s role in Africa’s economic growth, citing investments in high-quality infrastructure projects such as ports, cross-border roads, railways, and industrial zones that have created numerous job opportunities.
Jordan’s Communist Party Secretary General Saud Qubailat commended China’s commitment to fair and just international relations, expressing appreciation for the dialogue’s opportunity to witness China’s achievements firsthand. Egyptian Assistant Foreign Minister Salah Eldin Abdel Sadiq echoed this sentiment, praising China’s mediation efforts in restoring Saudi-Iran diplomatic ties and its growing role in fostering regional stability. He highlighted the belief that China’s diplomatic efforts bring significant security benefits to the Middle East, stating, “if not China, then who?” Finally, in a written address to the dialogue, Mahmoud Abbas, chairman of Fatah and president of Palestine, acknowledged China's growing influence in the Arab world and its leadership in multilateral forums such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS. Abbas emphasized China’s contributions to building a multipolar world and lauded initiatives like the Global Civilization Initiative, which he described as essential for global cooperation and the well-being of humanity.
Beijing uses this platform to some extent as a public endorsement of China’s political and economic models, while also cementing China’s status as a primary partner for infrastructure development, trade, and investment. These endorsements from political elites do more than strengthen bilateral relations; they can serve as a force multiplier for China’s own image building project, to position Beijing as a reliable global power, capable of offering both economic growth and regional stability.
Economic Leverage: The Belt and Road Initiative and Beyond
Beyond political alignment, China’s growing influence in the Arab world is equally tied to economic leverage. Through infrastructure investments and trade agreements under the Belt and Road Initiative, China has managed to secure a long-term economic opportunities in the region. The CAPPD is integral to this effort by providing the diplomatic framework within which economic cooperation can flourish, which is reinforcing to the party’s own success narrative. The political leaders participating in the CAPPD often return to their countries with a renewed understanding of how China’s economic model can align with their national interests—whether through investment in infrastructure, access to Chinese markets, or support for regional development projects.
This blended party-led economic diplomacy is a unique feature of China’s outreach. By embedding itself in the development of Arab economies, the party can reinforce political discourse with state-led tangible, on-the-ground realities. Through this lens, the CAPPD acts as both a political and economic tool, allowing China to directly shape the region’s economic trajectory, while also building a foundation of trust that aligns Arab states with China’s broader geostrategic objectives.
Public Diplomacy: Shaping Perceptions Across Borders
Public diplomacy is another critical component of China’s CAPPD strategy. While political elites are the immediate targets of China’s engagement, public diplomacy seeks to foster a broader ideological shift within Arab societies. By focusing on people-to-people exchanges, media engagement, and cultural diplomacy, the party helps positions China’s image as a constructive power committed to the prosperity and stability of the region.
The public dimension of the CAPPD is particularly evident in China’s efforts to cultivate positive perceptions among Arab populations. As political leaders publicly praise China for its non-interference policy and commitment to regional peace, these endorsements can resonate throughout the broader public. Prior to COVID-19, these endorsements had little influence. But over the past few years, public sentiment in the Middle East toward China has improved, especially since Saudi-Iran deal and the Gaza war. By leveraging the CAPPD as a tool to shape public opinion, China ensures that its narrative of economic development, sovereignty, and cooperation is not only embraced by government elites but also by grassroots communities.
Non-Government Diplomacy: Expanding Influence Through Civil Society
While much of the CAPPD’s focus is on political elites, non-government diplomacy, while not a central feature, play an increasingly important role in China’s engagement with the Arab world, especially think tanks. These engagements provide China with valuable access to local intellectual networks and serve as a platform to cultivate grassroots support for its initiatives. Through the CAPPD, Beijing engages with local actors who align with its narrative of peaceful development, multilateral cooperation, and economic growth. Think tanks and similar organizations play a crucial role in legitimizing China’s presence in the region, extending support for its policies beyond government elites to broader segments of Arab society. This layer of soft power helps China counterbalance Western influence in global governance and navigate regional sensitivities by fostering a perception of China as a constructive and reliable partner. As a result, China’s influence is not only reinforced at the state level but is gradually woven into the intellectual and social fabric of the region, making its engagement more sustainable and resilient to external criticism.
Risks and Challenges: Navigating Complex Geopolitics
Despite its strategic advantages, China’s growing influence in the Arab world does not come without its challenges. Arab states are increasingly balancing relations with both China and the West. While China’s non-interference policy and economic opportunities make it an attractive partner, there are still concerns about debt dependency from BRI projects and potential backlash from the West, especially as China’s political influence grows. Moreover, the geopolitical rivalry between China and the United States means that Arab states must navigate a delicate balance, ensuring that their relationships with China do not undermine their traditional ties with the West.
Does it work?
It is very difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of China’s political parties platform. Overall, Beijing’s influence efforts in the region is, to some extent, productive in achieving the desired outcome of improving its image among local populations and cultivating greater support from political elites. But, one must be careful not to overly credit this platform, when many of the large political parties and monarchies in the region choose not to participate. They choose to engage China bilaterally through official channels.
As China strengthens its ties with Arab political elites and civil society, it will also reinforce its vision of a multipolar world where China’s leadership is not only accepted but also embraced by nations traditionally aligned with Western powers. The CAPPD serves this mission in China’s diplomatic toolbox, enabling Beijing to forge lasting relationships with Arab states, while positioning itself as a force for regional stability and global peace.
Parts of this paper are derived and updated from my previous long-form paper on Chinese influence in the eastern Mediterranian. You can read it here.